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Executive Summary
In spring 2014, The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) requested
that the UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team
research creative funding mechanisms to finance the upfront investments
required for large-scale blight reduction efforts. Specifically, NORA tasked the
study team with identifying mechanisms to finance the title clearance services
necessary for property disposition and the infrastructure investments required
to implement cost-reducing alternative land management strategies for 310
properties. Our analysis found that of these 310 properties, NORA acquired
295 through expropriation and 15 through adjudication.
This report presents NORA with four distinct strategies for the effective disposition of these 310 properties, two of which involve the use of a relatively new
financial instrument known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB). SIBs are not traditional, fixed-rate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds; rather,
SIBs more closely resemble a rigorous, performance-based contract between
multiple parties, that combines aspects of both debt and equity. Unlike performance-based contracts, SIBs use private investment to fund the upfront costs,
and reduce the burden placed on taxpayers, of preventative services that deliver long-term cost savings. Although SIBs have been used for people-based
programs, our research suggests that the model’s flexibility potentially allows
for its application to place-based programs such as blight remediation. After
conducting a spatial analysis of the characteristics of NORA’s lots, we divided
these 310 properties into groups based on their physical features and the
market conditions of the neighborhoods in which they are located. We present
the following four strategies for the sale or effective transfer of these lots from
NORA to private entities:

Strategy I – Title Clearance for Sale at Auction
The purpose of this strategy is to clear titles to properties in relatively strong
markets, so that NORA can sell these properties at auction. We identified this
strategy as appropriate for 43 expropriated properties in census blocks with
relatively strong market demand. Through an analysis of blight remediation
efforts in other cities and conversations with local title attorneys, we estimate

that title clearance costs for expropriated properties will generally average
$17,000. SIB financing is not suitable to fund the upfront title clearance costs
in this particular strategy, given the limited social benefit of returning blighted
properties in relatively strong real estate markets to private individuals; we
therefore recommend that NORA consider using a performance-based contract to finance this strategy. Through this financing model, NORA could pay
the title agency responsible for clearing the titles to these lots with the income
that the sale of these properties generates. This strategy will result in programmatic income for NORA as well as long term cost savings, while also
contributing to NORA’s mission of neighborhood revitalization.

Strategy II –Clustered Redevelopment
Although SIB-financing is not appropriate for title clearance alone, our research and analysis indicates NORA could potentially use SIB funding to
finance catalytic redevelopment projects in transitional markets. This strategy, clustered redevelopment, is best suited for concentrations of expropriated properties in markets where there is not enough demand for NORA to
reasonably expect to auction off the properties on a piecemeal basis, even if
they had clear titles, but where a strategically-placed development could spur
neighborhood revitalization. We identified 48 properties in four distinct clusters (located in the Broadmoor/Central City, Algiers/Whitney, Desire/St. Roch,
and Florida/St. Claude neighborhoods) as appropriate for this strategy. These
clusters also overlap with the City of New Orleans’s current place-based
redevelopment efforts. The sale of these properties at a discounted rate to a
development partner would cover the title clearance costs of these properties
while also providing a social investor with an estimated return on investment
of almost 5%.

Strategy III – Stormwater Management
Stormwater management calls for a partnership between NORA and the Sewerage and Water Board (S&WB), in which NORA transfers 43 expropriated
vacant properties in areas with a high risk of flooding to the S&WB. Through a
SIB, the S&WB and private investors would finance the construction of stormwater infrastructure on these lots. The S&WB is currently operating under an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consent decree requiring it to spend

$2 million to improve water quality. This spending requirement, in addition
to the long term cost savings generated through stormwater management,
serves as the S&WB’s incentive for program participation. A SIB partnership
between NORA and the S&WB could provide the opportunity for NORA to
reduce its maintenance responsibility for vacant properties and for the S&WB
to meet the goals mandated in the consent decree.

Strategy IV – Lot Leasing
The final strategy calls for the expansion of NORA’s Growing Green program,
by incentivising the green intermediary to expand the scale of the program.
By allowing the green intermediary to share in the income and cost savings
generated by lot leasing, NORA can take the Growing Green program to
scale and reduce the agency’s maintenance costs. We identified 157 properties suitable for lot leasing, clustered in the Lower Ninth Ward/ Holy Cross
neighborhoods and the McDonough neighborhood. As in Strategy I, NORA
can finance this program through a performance-based model in which
NORA pays the green intermediary group a percentage of the revenues and
cost savings generated by shifting the land banking and maintenance responsibility for these lots to community groups. We estimate that over 10 years
this strategy could produce over $800,000 in net savings and income for the
agency, whereas NORA’s current practice of maintaining and insuring these
lots is projected to cost almost $900,000 during the same period.

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................................10
Social Impact Bonds................................................................................................14
Case Study One: Fighting Adolescent Recidivism at Rikers Island.............19
Social Impact Bonds and Blight...............................................................................26
Case Study Two: Restoring People & Properties Through SIBs.
Bristol Together, United Kingdom.................................................................33
Analysis...................................................................................................................36
Title Clearance Strategies.......................................................................................42
Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction..............................................43
Strategy II: Clustered Redevelopment..........................................................46
Alternative Land Management Strategies...............................................................56
Strategy III: Stormwater Management..........................................................56
Strategy IV: Lot Leasing...............................................................................62
Next Steps...............................................................................................................68
Appendicies.............................................................................................................74

List of Maps, Tables, and Figures
Figure 1: Standard Social Impact Bond Structure...................................................15
Table 1: Best Practices Framework for SIB Project Selection (1)...........................22
Table 2: Summary of Blight Remediation’s Ability to Meet SIB Selection Criteria....32
Map 1: Strategy I - Title Clearance for Sale at Auction...........................................44
Map 2: Strategy II - Clustered Redevelopment.......................................................48
Figure 2: Clustered Redevelopment SIB Financing Model.......................................50
Table 3: Potential Revenue from Redevelopment Clusters....................................53
Map 3: Strategy III - Stormwater Management.......................................................59
Figure 3: Stormwater Management SIB Financing Model.........................................61
Map 4: Strategy IV - Lot Leasing............................................................................63
Table 4: Potential Revenue and Cost Savings From Lot Leasing...........................66
Map 5: Complete Overview of Strategies...............................................................69

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In 2012, the City of New Orleans possessed almost 36,000 vacant or blighted
properties, making it one of the most blighted cities in the nation.1 While
public officials, community groups, developers, and other stakeholders have
made substantial progress in returning blighted properties to the private real
estate market, many New Orleans neighborhoods remain littered with blighted
homes and vacant lots. The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA),
charged with the maintenance and redevelopment of approximately 2,600
vacant or blighted properties, plays a substantial role in the revitalization
of the city. NORA, a quasi-governmental agency that relies primarily on
federal grant funding to finance its operations, has some powers typically
associated with government agencies including the authority to issue bonds
and expropriate properties. While its quasi-governmental status provides
NORA with some insulation from the electoral politics and special interests
that can interfere with public blight remediation strategies, it also places
NORA in a precarious funding situation relative to public agencies that
receive a dedicated millage in the city’s property tax system. With federal
disaster recovery funds dwindling, NORA is now seeking new and innovative
strategies to fund neighborhood revitalization and blight elimination.
NORA has requested that the UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance
Capstone Study Team (to be referred to as the study team) research creative
funding mechanisms to finance the upfront investments required for largescale blight reduction efforts. Specifically, NORA has tasked the study team
with identifying mechanisms to finance the title clearance services necessary
for property disposition and the infrastructure investments required to
implement cost-reducing alternative land management strategies for 310
properties. These properties are distinct from other lots in NORA’s inventory
in that NORA did not acquire them through the Road Home Program via the
Louisiana Land Trust (LLT)—a non-profit organization formed to manage the
properties purchased by the state under the Road Home Program.2 These
non-Louisiana Land Trust (non-LLT) properties present some challenges—
most notably, with regard to the status of their titles—the LLT properties do
not.

1
2

Plyer, A., & Ortiz, E. (2012). Benchmarks for blight: How much blight does New Orleans have? Accessed, March 3rd, 2014. Available: http://www.datacenterresearch.org/
reports_analysis/benchmarks-for-blight
Louisiana Land Trust. Accessed, May 3rd, 2014. Available: from http://www.lalandtrust.
us/
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Introduction

NORA requested specific analysis on a relatively new financial instrument
known as a Social Impact Bond (SIB). SIBs are not traditional, fixedrate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds; rather, SIBs more
closely resemble a “rigorous, performance-based contract between multiple
parties,” that combine aspects of both debt and equity.3 SIBs use private
investment, whereas performance-based contracts use public investment,
to fund programs that produce measurable social benefits and quantifiable
cost savings to government agencies. If the program meets pre-determined,
standardized outcomes, the investors receive a return on their investment
from the cost savings to the government. The private investment in SIBs
makes them more attractive to municipalities since, unlike performance-based
contracts, less burden is placed on taxpayers. To date, SIBs have been used
solely for people-based programs, such as recidivism reduction services
and preschool education. The use of SIBs to finance blight remediation is
currently untested in the United States. This report will provide an overview of
the possible operations of such a program.
Over the past few months, the study team performed literature reviews,
interviews, legislative analyses, and mapping analyses to inform our
recommendations. We looked at other communities facing similar problems,
such as Detroit, Baltimore, and Cleveland, to identify best-practice strategies
to combat blight. The study team also contacted agencies, organizations,
and individuals involved in SIB-financing to obtain an in-depth understanding
of how this innovative new tool could be used to combat blight and to assist
NORA, specifically. (An inventory of SIB-financed projects is available in
Appendix A).
Armed with the knowledge acquired during this research and analysis, we
developed four distinct cost-reduction strategies. These strategies fall into
two categories—disposition strategies and alternative land management
strategies. Disposition strategies include title clearance for auction, and
clustered redevelopment, while alternative land management strategies
include stormwater management and lot leasing. The study team has
established specific criteria, and utilized Geographic Information System
(GIS) mapping software to determine which NORA-owned properties were
appropriate for each strategy. Finally, we determined financing mechanisms
through which NORA could implement each approach.
3

Shah, S., & Costa, K. (2013). Social finance: A primer - understanding innovation
funds, impact bonds, and impact investing. Washington, DC: Center for American
Progress. p. 12
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Social Impact Bonds

In recent years, government budget deficits and shifting political priorities
have resulted in policy makers either cutting or consolidating publiclyfunded social services such as public housing, healthcare, and education.4
Foundations and other charitable organizations have a long history of
providing the public with social services when government resources are
stretched to capacity. In our current era of public fiscal austerity, however,
private for-profit entities and investors have become involved in the social
service sector to an unprecedented degree.5 The influx of investor capital into
traditionally public or philanthropically-funded social services is often called
impact investing. The “rise of the social or impact investor – where funders
are interested in results and returns, both social and financial, on their capital,”
has been well documented.6 The most recent trend in impact investing is an
innovative finance mechanism called the Social Impact Bond (SIB).
SIBs leverage private investment to finance the delivery of preventive social
services for which public agencies are unable to obtain adequate start-up
capital, or for which current budgetary allocations do not provide the funding
necessary to take an existing, proven program to scale.7 Again, SIBs are
not traditional, fixed-rate-and-term security bonds such as municipal bonds;
rather, SIBs more closely resemble a “rigorous, performance based contract
between multiple parties,” that combines aspects of both debt and equity.8
In the most common SIB model, a government entity identifies a costly
social problem and then enters into a contract with a private intermediary
that works to attract investments and procure social service providers.9
Since the government only pays for the projects after the program meets
pre-determined, quantifiable outcomes, the intermediary obtains its initial
operating budget—the funds that are used to pay the social service
providers—from socially-minded private investors.10 If the program is indeed
successful, it should result in public cost savings or revenue that the

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Roman, J., & Walsh, K. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: Committee of the Whole Council
of the District of Columbia. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Clark, C. H., Massarsky, C., Raben, T., & Worsham, E. (2012). Scaling Social Impact:
A Literature Toolkit for Investors. Growth Philanthropy Network and Duke University.
Ibid.
Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
Shah, S., & Costa, K. (2013). Social finance: A primer - understanding innovation
funds, impact bonds, and impact investing. Washington, DC: Center for American
Progress. p. 12
Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
Ibid.
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government entity uses to pay back the intermediary. The intermediary then
provides the private investors with a return on their investment.11

Social Impact Bonds

We describe how a SIB model functions below, through a discussion of the
first SIB-funded program in the U.S.—an anti-recidivism program on Rikers
Island referred to as the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE).
The full description of the ABLE case study, Case Study 1, is on page 19.

Social Impact Bond Structure
The diagram of the SIB model in Figure 1 illustrates how a SIB is used to
finance a social program. This section reviews the role that each entity plays
in the model.
Figure 1: Standard Social Impact Bond Structure

11

Ibid.

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

15

Social Impact Bonds

Government
Generally, the SIB process begins when a government agency identifies a
social service or program that, if taken to scale, could result in measurable
cost savings or revenue generation within a reasonable timeframe.12 In the
ABLE case study, Case Study 1, for instance, the New York City’s Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS)—the government entity—sought to
expand the scale of an existing and effective program—the ABLE program.13
While relatively costly, ABLE had been demonstrably effective at reducing
recidivism rates and public penal expenditures on a per prisoner basis. DHHS
and Mayor Bloomberg’s administration decided to pursue SIB financing in
order to secure additional, upfront funding for the program. The goal was to
increase the magnitude of its social and fiscal benefits, generating net savings
over the course of just a few years.
Generally, governments are attracted to this method of financing because it
allows them to bring proven programs to scale, and reduces the obstacles
to funding financially-sound but politically difficult expenditures—such as a
multi-million dollar investment in incarcerated people. More specifically, if
the program fails to produce the desired impact, the government entity is
not required to repay the investors. As such, the model insures that local
governments do not use public funds to finance ineffective programs, while
also providing much needed funding to support expensive but effective
policies.

Intermediary
In the traditional SIB model, the government entity does not approach
investors itself. Rather, it enters into a performance-based contract with
an intermediary. The government entity identifies its goals and desired
outcomes, and the intermediary is responsible for achieving those outcomes.
It is therefore the intermediary that is responsible for identifying investors
and obtaining the upfront investment necessary to fund programmatic
operations. The intermediary acts as a middleman, setting performance-based
12
13

Ibid.
The City of New York Office of the Mayor. (2012, August 2). Mayor Bloomberg, 		
Deputy Mayor Gibbs, and Corrections Commissioner Schriro Announce Nation’s First
Social Impact Bond Program. Accessed, February 12th, 2014. Available: http://www.
goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/urban-investments/case-		
studies/social-impact-bond-pdf.pdf
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measurements, securing and accepting initial investments from the private
sector, hiring and managing the service providers, and, eventually, receiving
savings-generated payments that are returned to the private funders.
Social Impact Bonds

Investors
Once the government entity engages an intermediary, the intermediary
identifies an investor or investors to provide the necessary upfront financing.14
Investment funds may come from a bank, a high net worth individual, a
foundation, or a combination of several of these entities.15 As discussed
previously, investors in SIBs tend to have dual motivations. While they expect
their investment to produce monetary returns, they are often willing to accept
relatively high risks and low yields, in order to finance a program that has a
positive social impact.16 17
The risk inherent in a SIB investment is greater than most investments,
because the equity partner will lose his or her entire contribution if the
program is unsuccessful. In the ABLE example, Goldman Sachs invested
$9.6 million in the prisoner rehabilitation program. Unless the program
successfully reduces recidivism by 10% over a 4-year period, Goldman Sachs
will not receive its full investment. It is important to note, however, Bloomberg
Philanthropies guaranteed $7.2 million of Goldman Sachs’ investment via
a grant in the program. In this way, the SIB model allows the City of New
York to leverage additional private financing using Bloomberg’s philanthropic
investment.
From the perspective of a foundational investor, the SIB model is highly
attractive because the same grant can be used multiple times to leverage
private financing and provide multiple rounds of social services. If the ABLE
program succeeds, Goldman Sachs will receive a return on its investment and
Bloomberg Philanthropies can reinvest its $7.2 million in another round of the
program or another social program.18

14
15
16
17
18

Shah & Costa
McKinsey & Company (2012). From action to potential: Bringing Social Impact 		
Bonds to the US. Washington, DC: McKinsey and Company.
Ibid.
Clark, Massarsky, Raben, & Worsham
The City of New York Office of the Mayor
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Service Providers
Service providers are hired by intermediaries with investor funds to implement
the social program.19 With the initial investment capital provided by private
funders, service providers are tasked with managing programs or projects that
contribute to the greater social good. These programs realize savings to the
government agency that initiated the SIB.
Social service providers are attracted to this model because they can develop
working partnerships with government agencies, and because the program
provides them with substantial upfront funding with which to implement
their work.20 The type of service provider is dependent on the nature of the
program. For instance, service providers in the New York example included
youth counseling and workforce training organizations.21 The upfront funding
from Goldman Sachs allows counseling and training methods proven to
reduce recidivism to be brought to scale.

Evaluators
The evaluator is an independent entity that measures the success of the
project. The government agency determines measurable goals at the outset of
the contract that to be evaluated by the evaluator. Intermediaries are then paid
by their ability to achieve or surpass these goals. The evaluator measures the
goals of the program by comparing the outcomes of the social service relative
to the outcomes of a comparison or control group without the services.22

19
20
21
22

Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
Ibid.
The City of New York Office of the Mayor
Liebman, J. & Sellman, A. (2013). Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and Local
Governments. Harvard Kennedy School.
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Source: http://blogs.villagevoice.com/

Social Impact Bonds

Case Study 1:
Fighting Adolescent
Recidvism at Rikers Island

New York City is paving the way for SIBs in the U.S. In August 2012, the city launched the country’s first SIB with the goal of lowering the recidivism rate among adolescents at Rikers Island,
the city’s main prison complex. The bond was initiated by the City of New York. Goldman Sachs
structured a $9.6 million loan to MDRC, a social policy research organization, which acts as the
intermediary. Bloomberg Philanthropies backed $7.2 million of that loan, reducing Goldman’s
investment risk. MDRC hired the Osborne Association and Friends of Island Academy, two
groups with proven track records of helping incarcerated youth, as the primary service providers
and the Vera Institute of Justice to serve as the independent evaluator.
Partnership Roles
Initiator: The City of New York
Service Providers: The Osborne Association, Friends of Island Academy
Intermediary: MDRC
Evaluator: The Vera Institute of Justice
Investors: Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg Philanthropies
Strategy
The program, officially called the Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE) Program,
seeks to reduce recidivism among adolescents by 10% over a four year period. An initial investment, provided by Goldman Sachs, will fund the service providers. Once the service providers
succeed in reducing the recidivism rate by 10%, the City of New York, with a newly realized
stream of savings, makes payments to MRDC. MRDC, acting as intermediary, then returns
these profits to Goldman Sachs. As a Community Redevelopment Act (CRA) financial institution, Goldman Sachs receives a CRA credit boost for operating within its own community.
Current Status
The SIB is in its second full year of the loan period. Initial results are still forthcoming.
Relevance to New Orleans Redevelopment Authority
This case study is relevant to NORA because it illustrates a typical, yet complex, SIB financial
structure. The contract took two years to finalize and is an example of how a SIB financing
structure can be very intricate and involve several partners. As the first SIB to be adopted in the
U.S., the success of the program is crucial for the future of this unique financing model.
Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds
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Strengths of The Social Impact Bond Model
The SIB model improves upon existing governmental budgeting and
evaluation processes for social programs by addressing several key
weaknesses in the current model. First, governments often lack the upfront
funds necessary to provide preventative services on a large scale, even if
these services have demonstrated social and fiscal benefits. SIB programs
help solve this problem by using private investment to fund the initial program
costs and then using the cost-savings generated by the program to refund the
original investment.
Second, government programs and their evaluation metrics are often
task-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. In other words, programs are
evaluated in terms of people served or money spent, rather than how effective
the public investment was at producing the desired outcome.23 This is largely
due to the nature of the electoral cycle and the timeframe considered during
the budgeting process. “Most budgets are built around funding the same
things that were funded the previous year…and fear of public scrutiny makes
it hard to take the risks associated with trying new things and then rigorously
evaluating them.”24 Because the SIB model relies on private investors, the
risk of failure—and thus the burden of quantifying success—shifts from the
public sector to the private sector. In this way, the SIB model has the dual
effect of allowing the public sector to pursue more innovative social service
mechanisms, while also insuring only proven programs receive public funding.

Limitations of Social Impact Bonds
The SIB model is not without limitations. First, the pool of potential investors
is relatively limited. The private equity partner in the SIB model may lose
its entire investment. Given this level of risk, the potential investor return
is relatively modest.25 As such, only philanthropically minded investors, or
those whose investments are backed by a philanthropic donation—such as
Goldman Sachs in the Rikers example—have expressed substantial interest
in SIBs, to date.

23
24
25

Liebman & Sellman 6
Ibid. 7
Fernandes, D. (2014, January 29). Goldman Sachs Buys ‘Social Impact’ Bonds. The
Boston Globe.
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Second, compared to the direct provision of public services, or a twoparty contract between a government and a service provider, the SIB
model is relatively complex. This complexity, as explained in an interview
with Sebastian Chaskel of the Harvard Kennedy School, makes SIBs
approximately 30% more expensive than more traditional forms of bond
financing. SIBs present additional temporal costs and burdens as well. The
Rikers Island contract, according to Chaskel, took approximately two years
from inception to closing.
Third, although SIBs have been heralded as facilitating innovation in the
public sector,26 the extent to which SIBs incentivize risk-taking is highly
limited. In order to mitigate risks, SIBs are generally used for programs with a
proven track record. As such, they are highly constrained in the type of social
programs they can finance. Furthermore, private investors—not the public or
elected officials—ultimately decide which programs are worthy of funding; this
private influence over public spending also limits the type of programs SIBs
can finance.
Finally, with the first U.S. SIB only halfway through the service provision
phase, the SIB model’s most obvious weakness is that it is still relatively
untested.27 Although there are European programs that have finished their
first performance evaluation cycle, even these programs are still relatively
nascent. In this sense, there exists significant leeway within the SIB model
for mistakes—and for opportunities.

Best Practices In Social Impact Bond Financing
SIBs can be modeled in several different ways, depending on program goals
and the specific problems a government agency faces in its work. Appendix A
of this report provides an inventory of existing SIB programs that identifies the
entities involved under their respective contracts. As indicated by the diverse
set of SIB programs in the appendix, there is room for innovation within the
SIB model. Because a SIB is merely a contract for services, government
agencies have significant flexibility in the financing structure they choose to
implement.

26
27

Liebman & Sellman 6
The City of New York Office of the Mayor
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However, there are several criteria that can help to determine if SIB financing
will help meet program goals (Table 1). Despite the SIB model’s novelty,
researchers and practitioners have constructed a loosely conceptualized
framework of best practices in SIB financing to date.
Table 1: Best Practices Framework for SIB Project Selection
Project Selection Criteria
Summary
Preventative Service

Should generate cost savings in the long run

Potential for high net benefits and public
sector savings

Project must have potential to bring real
financial savings that can be used to repay
investors

Measurable outcomes

Agencies must select quantifiable social
outcomes

Credible impact assessments (a “but-for”
test)

Intermediary must prove outcomes were the
direct result of the intervention, and would
not have occurred without it

   

Sufficient sample sizes

Part of criterion above

   

Well-defined treatment population

Part of criterion above

Reasonable timeframe

Program should provide returns within 5-10
years

Safeguards for population

The program (or its failure) will not harm the
target population

Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis

SIB-financing works best for programs that deliver a preventative service—
one that may carry significant upfront costs, but delivers even greater future
cost savings.28 It’s important, however, that future cost savings are high
relative to initial costs. The transaction costs in a SIB-model represent
approximately 30% of the program’s costs. As such, only programs that
generate high net benefits and public sector savings are suitable for SIBfinancing.29 An equally essential criterion is that the program or social service
being funded produces measurable outcomes.
The extent to which a program or service can deliver measurable outcomes
is essential to the feasibility of SIB-financing. Programmatic success must
be quantifiable to be relevant to investors.30 Furthermore, one of the primary
benefits of the SIB model is its rigorous performance evaluation of social
programs. Rather than defining success as the number of people serviced by
28
29
30

Liebman & Sellman
Shah & Costa
Ibid.

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

22

a program—as many current social programs do—a SIB-financed program
will define success by its outcomes. In order to do so in a reliable way, these
outcomes must be objective and quantifiable.
Social Impact Bonds

To date, SIB structures in the U.S. have sought to emulate an experimental
set-up.31 In this model, programmatic success is measured in terms of
whether or not the target group demonstrates statistically significant rates of
success relative to a control group.32 There are several mutually supportive
criteria that must fit together for this quasi-experimental model to work. First,
such a model requires a well-defined treatment population. The idea here is
that the outcomes of the target group should be compared to the outcomes
of a control group when evaluating the success of the SIB. For this to work,
the treatment population needs to be comparable, but distinct, from a nontreatment population. While this has proven relatively simple with recidivismbased programs (in which a random selection of prisoners can go through
the program, while another randomly selected group of prisoners does not),
it can become more complicated with more nuanced SIB-programs, such as
the Bristol Together and Midlands Together models discussed in Case Study
2. The other sub-component of this criterion is that of sample size. In the
U.S., SIB-financed programs have used target populations of a large enough
sample size to establish causality. The Harvard Kennedy School’s best
practices handbook on SIB financing indicates that people-based programs
should have a minimum of 200 participants.33
The fifth primary criterion requires the program’s benefits accrue over a
reasonable time frame. While socially motivated investors may be willing
to wait for a longer period of time to receive their returns or evaluate
programmatic impacts than other types of investors, most experts agree SIB
programs should structure their benefits to accrue within a five-year time
frame.34
Finally, if the service provider is delivering a vital service—such as essential
health care, there need to be safeguards for the population. In such
programs, if the program fails, individual citizens within the target population
will suffer real harm.

31
32
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Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
Liebman & Sellman
Ibid.
Ibid.
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SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
AND BLIGHT

SIBs and Blight

To date, Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have been used exclusively for peoplebased programs in the U.S. There is, however, growing interest among
local governments, consultants, and community development experts in
using SIB financing to fund place-based programs.35, SIBs are an innovative
but relatively untested method of providing governments with funding, and
the application of SIBs to blight remediation programs creates additional
uncertainty, not least because the combination is unprecedented.
A strong case can be made for using SIBs to fund blight reduction programs.
As this section will discuss, SIBs have garnered modest but growing levels of
attention among real estate-focused community development professionals in
the U.S. Moreover, at least one program in the United Kingdom (U.K.), called
Bristol Together (detailed in Case Study 2), has successfully implemented
an ongoing SIB-funded program that targets both people and places.36
The Bristol Together model, which is also now in use in the Midlands,
U.K., combines the costs and benefits of workforce training for formerly
incarcerated people with those of blight remediation.37
This section explores the feasibility of using SIBs for place-based programs,
and finds that there is room within the SIB framework for blight remediation.
These discussions lay the groundwork for identifying the means through which
NORA, specifically, could use SIB financing to achieve its goals.

The Cost of Blight
Blight is most often identified with rust-belt cities such as Detroit, but even
Sunbelt cities such as Phoenix and Orlando are home to a growing inventory
of vacant lots and abandoned properties following the foreclosure crisis of
the mid-2000s.38 In a 2010 Brookings Institute survey of 60 mid-size to large
cities, two in every 1,000 properties were reported as vacant.39 Across the
country, blight places serious social and fiscal burdens on metropolitan areas.
35

36
37
38
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Muchin, K. (2013, June 14). Response to Illinois Request for Information: Social
Impact Bonds - Community revitalization and blight remediation. Evanston, IL: BriCK
Partners, LLC; Rogers, R. (2014, March 7). Richmond to explore new plan to fix
blighted housing stock. Contra Costa Times; Roman, J. (2013, November 6). Social
Impact Bonds: A new model to reduce blight. The Huffington Post.
Bristol Together Community Interest Company. (2013). Bristol Together: Job creation
for ex-offenders. Retrieved March 20, 2014, from http://www.bristoltogether.co.uk/
aboutus.htm
Ibid.
Hollander, J. (2011). Sunburnt cities: The Great Recession, depopulation, and urban
planning in the American Sunbelt. New York, NY: Routledge.
Pagano, M.A. & O’Bowman. (2010). Vacant land in cities: An urban resource. 		
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center On Urban and Metropolitan Policy. p. 6.
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Foreclosed upon or otherwise abandoned properties fall into disrepair, and
the presence of these unsightly and potentially unsafe lots or buildings leads
to diminished demand for real estate in the surrounding area. This process is
often self-reinforcing; blight leads to lower property values and less demand,
which in turn causes property-owners to abandon or neglect their property,
creating additional blight. Vacant lots can harbor crime and the presence of
visibly neglected properties can undermine a community’s social cohesion
and character. There are also several significant direct costs associated with
blight. Blight’s fiscal costs include:
The reduction in property tax revenue due to high rates of tax delinquency
among owners of abandoned or vacant lots.

•

The reduction in the property tax revenue generated by properties
proximate to blight, which typically experience a decline in their property
values and often fall into blighted conditions themselves.

•

The complete loss of property tax revenue from blighted properties that fall
into municipal ownership.

•

The property maintenance costs that must be borne by the municipality for
city-owned lots.40

SIBs and Blight

•

The non-profit advocacy organization Smart Growth America summarizes
these costs, stating that “managing vacant properties ties up the time of
municipal employees and the resources of municipal taxpayers. At the same
time, these properties depress the value of other properties and generate little
or no tax revenue themselves.” 41

The Cost of Blight Remediation
Unfortunately, reducing blight is costly and successful outcomes are
elusive. Cities that own properties acquired through adjudication or due to
code-violations face multiple obstacles to putting the properties back into
commerce, including solving costly title problems and liens. But it can also be
difficult for municipalities to even consider investing in disposition or

40
41

Smart Growth America. (2005). Vacant properties: The true cost to communities. 		
Washington, DC: National Vacant Properties Campaign. Accessed March 10, 2014.
Available: http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-costs.pdf
Ibid. p. 20
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redevelopment strategies when there is an immediate need to budget for the
maintenance costs necessary to keep vacant lots up to code.

SIBs and Blight

The costs of blight remediation fall into two broad categories. The first
category—redevelopment costs—consists of the costs associated with
returning blighted properties to commerce. This is a particularly significant
challenge in weak markets, which, almost by definition, are the types of
markets or neighborhoods in which blight tends to be most prevalent. These
costs include the time and money spent on clearing clouded titles, as well as
the marketing or subsidy costs required to encourage people or organizations
to purchase the properties once a clear title has been established.42
The second category consists of maintenance related costs. These include
property maintenance expenditures such as grass mowing and insurance.
This category can also include upfront investments in low-maintenance
vegetation or other alternative land management strategies that will save the
municipality money in the long run.
In the sense that these upfront costs deliver long-term benefits, blight
remediation appears to be a feasible target for SIB financing. But certain
characteristics of the SIB model, as it has been implemented to date, do not
intuitively conform to the funding needs of blight redevelopment or creative
land maintenance strategies. The next section of this report explores the
potential use of SIBs for blight remediation in greater detail.

Blight Remediation as a SIB-financed Project
While the practicality of using SIBs for blight remediation depends largely
on the blight remediation program itself, blight reduction inherently presents
both obstacles and opportunities for incorporation into the SIB model.
Indeed, some experts have expressed doubts regarding the viability of this
combination.43 Concerns stem largely from the challenges associated with
defining a treatment population and a control group—as one would do in
a people-based program—and the associated problems with establishing
causality. Other experts, however, have suggested that the power of SIB
financing lies in its flexibility, not in the extent to which it mimics a controlled

42
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United States Conference of Mayors. (2008). Vacant and abandoned properties: Survey and best practices. Washington, DC: City Policy Associates.
Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
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experiment. As one researcher knowledgeable on the subject stated, “SIBs
are not a noun; they are a concept.”44
The limiting factor for any project that relies on private funding is investor
willingness. Despite their novelty, SIBs are no exception to this rule. This
section explores how blight fits into the program-selection framework
described in the previous section. It reveals that the opportunities associated
with the natural overlap between real estate investment and bond-financing
potentially offset the challenges associated with scale and measurement.

SIBs and Blight

Is it a preventative service?
Conceptually, blight remediation is a preventative service in that the upfront
costs associated with returning a blighted property to market or installing
maintenance-cost reducing infrastructure can result in even greater cost
savings over time. Furthermore, since the costs of rehabilitating blighted
buildings increase over time, redeveloping a property sooner rather than later
generally leads to greater cost-savings in the long run.

Is there potential for high net benefits and public sector
savings?
For blight, revenue generating potential depends largely on the number of
lots in the target geography, and more specifically, on the estimate of property
tax revenues, maintenance cost savings, or other revenue streams that could
be generated following the provision of the SIB-funded service. Programs
that involve many lots or one large project that presents the potential for a
high return through revenue generation could be excellent candidates for SIB
financing.
The case study on the aforementioned Bristol Together (Case Study 2),
provides an example of a blight remediation program—albeit one delivered
via an anti-recidivism workforce training program—that generated enough
revenue to fund a second service delivery cycle and provide financiers with a
4-6% return on their investment. This suggests that blight remediation can in
fact provide a significant enough return to be an attractive investment for SIBfinanciers.
44

Roman, J. (2014, March 7). Senior Associate, Urban Institute - Justice Policy Center.
(K. Tear, Interviewer)
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SIBs and Blight

Are there measurable outcomes?
A primary programmatic criterion for SIB compatibility is identifying a
performance metric that is both reliably measurable, and highly indicative
of both programmatic success and financial returns.45 Some experts have
expressed concern over SIB compatibility with blight reduction specifically
because the outcomes can be difficult to measure.46 While the cost-savings
presented by maintenance cost reduction or increases in property tax
revenues are intrinsically tied to the success of the program, they can be
challenging to measure systematically. For instance, property tax revenues
enter a municipality’s general fund, but maintenance cost savings may accrue
to a different government entity. One expert has suggested that in the case of
blight remediation, a simpler metric may be desirable.47 Simple metrics, from
an investor’s perspective, could include the number of lots that the city sells,
or the square acreage of ground upon which cost-reducing native species are
planted. So long as the government entity can guarantee the investor a return
on their funding if the agreed upon standards are met, these simple metrics
could prove to be satisfactory to both government and investor. But blight is
inherently difficult to develop, and alternative land management strategies are
not particularly lucrative. Guaranteeing the investor a return, particularly given
the additional transaction costs that the SIB model presents, is the challenging
aspect of using SIB-financing for blight remediation.

Is the sample size sufficient and treatment population defined
enough to establish credible impact assessments?
Blight remediation strategies inherently conflict with this criterion for several
reasons. Blight-remediation, like many place-based strategies, often works
best when public policies are targeted towards groups that are either
geographically, physically, or otherwise similar, establishing a control group
that also exhibits these characteristics but is not a part of the program is
highly challenging.
For instance, in March 2014, the city of Richmond in California passed a
resolution directing city staff to work towards the implementation of a SIB45
46
47

Ibid; Galloway, I. (2013). Funding holistic community development with pay for 		
success. Washington, DC: Nonprofit Finance Fund.
Chaskel, S. Harvard Kennedy School – Social Impact Bond Financing Lab. February
26th, 2014. Phone interview. Interviewed by Karl Tear.
Roman, J. (2014, March 7). Senior Associate, Urban Institute - Justice Policy Center.
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funded Distressed Housing Rehabilitation Program.48 The resolution states
that the “initial target properties would likely be the ‘worst of the worst,’ in
terms of condition.”49 From a public policy perspective, it makes sense to
focus on (or perhaps triage) particularly problematic groups. But for Richmond
to do so undermines the pseudo-experimental structure that some SIB
experts believe a SIB-funded program must have. Obtaining a large enough
sample size to meet this requirement is also a challenge.

SIBs and Blight

Again, this criterion assumes that investors will want, more or less, to see
statistical significance, but the extent to which this criterion is even applicable
to blight remediation is unclear. Bristol Together (Case Study 2), and its follow
up program, Midlands Together, prove that investors may be amenable to less
scientifically rigorous forms of evaluation, so long as the potential risks and
returns of the investment are clear.

Do the program’s benefits accrue over a reasonable timeframe?
There are many blight-remediation programs that produce cost savings or
revenue generation within five to ten years. The reduction of maintenance
costs for city-owned properties can produce immediate savings, for instance,
as can returning city-owned lots to the private property market and property
tax roll. Of course, in the long-term, savings and revenue may be even more
significant, as blight reduction creates a domino effect, slowly facilitating the
long-term appreciation of a property values.

Are there safeguards for the target population?
Reducing blight benefits the municipality and its general population, but failing
to do so does not cause explicit harm to the public. Blight reduction is an
elective not an essential public service and individual residents do not stand
to lose if the program does not succeed. Table 2 summarizes the discussion
regarding the applicability of SIB-financing to blight-remediation programs.

48
49

Richmond City Council. (2014). Resolution 20G-4. City of Richmond.
Ibid. p. 4
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SIBs and Blight

Table 2: Summary of Blight Remediation’s
Ability to Meet SIB Selection Criteria
Project Selection Criteria

Potential for Blight Remediation to
Meet Criterion

Preventative Service

Yes

Potential for high net benefits and public
sector savings

Yes

Measurable outcomes

Possible

Credible impact assessments (a “but-for”
test)

Possible, but challenging

Sufficient sample sizes

Unlikely

Well-defined treatment population

Possible, but challenging

Reasonable timeframe

Possible

Safeguards for population

N/A

Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis

Our research indicates that the primary challenge associated with applying
SIBs to blight remediation strategies is not their incompatibility with
experimental set-ups or the presence of confounding variables. Rather, it
is simply identifying blight remediation strategies that will reliably produce
enough revenue to cover their costs in a reasonable amount of time. Bristol
Together and Midlands Together have been able to successfully fund their
intervention services--both people based and place-based through renovatedproperty sales alone, because the sale price outweighed the renovation costs.
In weaker real estate markets, additional subsidy--such as donated materials
or discounted labor, as indicated in the City of Richmond’s RFP--may be
required for the model to function.
What constitutes an effective strategy will depend largely on the local market,
municipal capacity, and the nature of the municipality’s blight problem.
Municipalities that are comfortable taking on the role of the developer, for
instance, are at an advantage because programmatic costs need not include
a developer’s marginal profits. Likewise, municipalities in which blight
manifests itself predominantly in large blocks of vacant land or brownfield
sites will have another advantage in that such sites lend themselves to
large-scale redevelopment. Despite the high upfront costs and significant
uncertainty associated with blight remediation programs, using SIBs to
finance these strategies is possible--it simply requires an efficient, more
streamlined version of the SIB model. The next section of this report returns
to the discussion of New Orleans’s blight problem, and the creative financing
strategies through which this problem can be addressed.
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Case Study Two:
Restoring People & Properties
Through SIBs. Bristol Together,
United Kingdom

SIBs and Blight

Source: Bristol Together

Bristol Together, a U.K. based social enterprise,
launched an innovative workforce development initiative
that seeks to provide employment to ex-offenders and
reduce recidivism while battling blight. Bristol Together
purchases vacant properties and, with their partners,
provides construction job training and employment to
program participants.

With Triodos Bank, Bristol Together was able to obtain £1.6 million from private investors including the Ese’em Fairbairn Foundation and Barrow Cadbury Trust. Bristol Together and Triodos Bank act as the intermediary; Aspire Bristol and Restore Trust are the service providers.
Partnership Roles
Initiator: Bristol Together
Service Providers: Aspire Bristol, Restore Trust
Intermediary: Bristol Together, Triodos Bank
Investors: Ese’em Fairbairn Foundation, Barrow Cadbury Trust, and private investors
Strategy
Bristol Together purchases vacant properties and employs ex-offenders to repair and refurbish
them. Once complete, the properties are sold and surplus revenue is reinvested into the organization and used to pay off investors. The program allows investors to choose between two
investment options: Series A bonds, with a 4% fixed annual interest rate; and Series B bonds,
with a 6% fixed annual interest rate. Investors who select the higher risk Series B option qualify
for tax relief through the Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) program. The CITR program
seeks to stimulate the flow of private capital to support enterprise in the UK’s deprived communities.
Current Status
The SIB is in its third full year of the loan period. Out of the initial 200 program participants that
were recruited in October 2011, 80% are have maintained employment with Bristol Together or
another company. The recidivism rate is less than 5%.
Relevance to New Orleans Redevelopment Authority
This case is relevant to NORA because it demonstrates that the SIB model can be utilized in
the redevelopment of blighted and vacant property.
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ANALYSIS

Analysis

In total, NORA has 2,593 properties in its inventory. Of these, NORA acquired
2,283 through the LLT. NORA acquired the remaining 310 properties through
expropriation or adjudication. The study team only included the 310 non-LLT
properties in this analysis. We focused on these properties because they
likely had serious title defects; as such, the cost of returning these properties
to commerce is higher than the cost of returning many LLT properties to the
private market. Moreover, many of these lots are in neighborhoods of historic
disinvestment and NORA may need to land bank them for many years due to
a lack of market demand. These conditions make the disposition of NORA’s
310 non-LLT lots difficult to finance; these lots are therefore good candidates
for disposition or alternative land management through creative financing
mechanisms. Furthermore, because NORA did not acquire these properties
through a federally-funded program like the Road Home, the income NORA
could receive from their sale would not have use restrictions. Therefore,
the non-LLT properties are most appropriate for SIB or alternative financing
strategies. If these strategies are successful, they can be applied to NORA’s
larger inventory.
NORA provided the team with an inventory of its properties. This included
non-LLT properties and LLT properties. Using information provided by NORA
and the Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, we determined which non-LLT
properties NORA acquired through expropriation—received from the city
through eminent domain—and which properties the agency acquired through
adjudication—received from the city through tax foreclosure. Appendix D
delineates which properties were expropriated as opposed to adjudicated as
determined by the study team.
The majority of NORA’s parcels are LLT properties and do not have title
issues. NORA’s 310 non-LLT properties, however, likely have serious title
defects. Of these 310 properties, the obstacles NORA faces in returning
the 295 expropriated properties to the private market are distinct from
the challenges it faces in returning the 15 adjudicated properties to the
private market. Specifically, although a title attorney can clear the title to
an expropriated property through a relatively straightforward, albeit costly,
process, NORA can only sell its adjudicated properties through a tax sale.
Even then, the buyer will not have a clear title to the adjudicated lot, making
these properties poor candidates for disposition.
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Clearing expropriated property titles in New Orleans is a straightforward
and well-defined process. A due process violation should not arise if after
reviewing the title abstract, the representation of all absentees by a curator
was ensured. If a curator did not represent all absentees, corrective action
will need to be taken. The title clearance of NORA’s adjudicated properties
is a more difficult process necessitating individual, case-by-case evaluation.
It would be safe for NORA to assume that all of its 15 adjudicated properties
have due process issues, and that one, in perpetuity, may make a claim to the
title. Therefore, to discharge these properties, NORA must determine what
its minimum threshold is for selling these properties (e.g. a percentage of
current appraised value). A potential avenue for discharging its adjudicated
properties, NORA may cluster adjudicated properties with cleared title
properties for sale and development. This may cause the adjudicated
property to be viewed as less of a risk to the developer.

Analysis

Based on our research, we developed four strategies for NORA’s non-LLT
properties: title clearance for sale at auction, clustered redevelopment,
stormwater management, and lot leasing. The objective of our Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) analysis was to identify which properties were the
most appropriate candidates for each strategy. We gathered data on Orleans
Parish’s real estate market and physical conditions and developed criteria for
each strategy. Utilizing GIS software, we identified the ideal properties for
each strategy.
To understand the potential demand for properties in each neighborhood, we
used the New Orleans Market Value Analysis (MVA). NORA commissioned
the community development finance organization, The Reinvestment Fund,
to complete the MVA in March 2013. The MVA is a “tool designed to assist
the private market and government officials to identify and…precisely craft
intervention strategies in weak markets and support sustainable growth in
stronger market segments.”50
The MVA looked at several different factors such as median residential sales
price, the foreclosure rate, the number of vacant units and other factors to
identify census blocks with strong market potential. With this information, the
MVA classified each census block with an alphabetical ranking of A through
H to determine the strength of that census block’s real estate market. For
50

The City of New Orleans. 2013. New Orleans market value analysis – final report 		
3.25.2013. Accessed April 20th, 2014. Available: https://data.nola.gov/Geographic-		
Reference/New-Orleans-Market-Value-Analysis-Final-Report-3-2/kex2-vq3e

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

37

Analysis

the purpose of this analysis, we grouped these classifications into three
categories of strong, transitional, and weak markets. Census blocks with an
MVA classification of A, B, or C were considered “strong markets,” census
blocks with an MVA classification of D or E were considered “transitional
markets,” and census blocks with an MVA classification of F, G, or H were
considered “weak markets.” We also looked at the current zoning, future
land use, and proposed zoning for Orleans Parish to determine what uses
were allowed on NORA-owned properties. We found that almost all non-LLT
properties were zoned residential.
We also considered the properties’ physical conditions, including whether
the property contained a structure or whether it was vacant, and its flood
risk. Unfortunately, the current Flood Insurance Rate Maps for Orleans
Parish are unavailable due to ongoing legal contestation. We therefore used
the advisory base flood elevation data developed by FEMA after Hurricane
Katrina. With help from the University of New Orleans’ Center for Hazards,
Assessment, Response and Technology (CHART) we classified which areas
had higher, moderate, and lower flood risk.
Using this data, we developed criteria for each strategy. The following
sections detail the criteria needed to qualify for each strategy.

Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction
The purpose of this strategy is to clear titles to properties in relatively strong
markets, so that NORA can sell these properties at auction. Properties
included in this category are located in census blocks with stronger resale
potential as defined by the MVA. These census blocks include MVA
classifications of A, B, and C. In addition to the MVA criteria, we only included
expropriated properties in this analysis. Since the goal of this strategy is to sell
properties at auction, we excluded adjudicated properties due to the lengthy
legal process required to clear the title to such properties.

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

38

Strategy II: Clustered Redevelopment

Analysis

The purpose of this strategy is to create catalytic redevelopment projects
in transitional markets by incentivizing the sale and redevelopment of
clusters of properties in transitional neighborhoods. The rationale here is
that the redevelopment of multiple, geographically proximate, properties
could spur neighborhood revitalization; furthermore, by clustering properties
together and actively engaging with a developer, NORA could incentivize
the sale and redevelopment of properties in transitional neighborhoods
in which developers might otherwise be reluctant to work. In identifying
clusters appropriate for this strategy, we excluded the properties identified
as appropriate for Strategy I: Title Clearance for Auction. We did, however,
include adjudicated properties. Although these properties are highly
challenging to sell, NORA could potentially transfer an adjudicated lot to the
developer or entity purchasing a bundle of nearby expropriated properties
through a tax sale.51 In order to increase the number of clusters for potential
redevelopment, we gave priority to expropriated and adjudicated properties
adjacent to one another and expropriated and adjudicated properties within
200 meters of a property received from the LLT.

Strategy III: Stormwater Management
Properties included in this strategy are not included in the strategies related
to title clearance and clustered redevelopment. Stormwater management
activities on vacant lots contribute to flood control efforts, so we only included
properties with high flood risk in this strategy. We excluded adjudicated
properties from this strategy. Given the significant capital expenditures
required for the installation of stormwater management infrastructure, we
decided it would be best to eliminate the risk of ownership claims completely,
by limiting this strategy to expropriated properties. In order to reduce the costs
associated with the installation of stormwater management infrastructure, we
only included vacant properties in this strategy. Additionally, since properties
51

Although there is no guarantee that a developer would necessarily want to purchase
an adjudicated property, NORA can present developers with several reasons why they
should consider purchasing one as part of a larger bundle of properties. The developer would have site control over the adjudicated property, and could use it as green
space during the 10-year period that it takes to acquire a clear title to such a property.
Moreover, over the course of the 10-years the property would likely appreciate in value
due to the developer’s and NORA’s work.
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in stronger market areas are more suited to sale at auction, only properties
located in MVA classifications of F, G, or H are included in the stormwater
management strategy.

Analysis

Strategy IV: Lot Leasing
The primary goal of this strategy is to reduce NORA’s long-term expenses
related to maintenance and insurance of properties. By leasing vacant lots to
community groups or individuals, NORA can shift maintenance and insurance
costs to these entities. We excluded properties identified for title clearance,
clustered redevelopment, or stormwater management from this strategy. As
in the stormwater management criteria, properties appropriate for lot leasing
are located in census blocks with MVA classifications of F, G, or H. We only
included vacant properties in this strategy, since a blighted structure limits
a property’s potential uses and increases NORA’s liability risk. Also, since
community groups and individuals will use these lots, the study team excluded
properties with high flood risk from the lot leasing strategy.
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TITLE CLEARANCE
STRATEGIES

NORA’s primary barrier to selling non-LLT lots is the upfront cost associated
with obtaining marketable titles. These costs can be difficult to justify
given the limited market demand for most blighted or vacant lots. Our
research indicates that title attorneys and agencies are willing to provide
their services at a discounted rate in order to obtain a contract for work on
multiple properties.52 Moreover, NORA simply cannot sell any of its properties
without obtaining clear title. As such, title clearance is a prerequisite to any
disposition strategy. The two disposition strategies outlined in this section-title clearance for sale at auction and clustered redevelopment—both rely
on NORA procuring a title agency to provide title clearance services at a
discounted rate, in bulk.

Title Clearance

Title agencies and attorneys vary in the extent to which they are willing to
discount their services for a large contract.53 For the purposes of this report,
however, we assume that per lot title clearance costs will average $17,000
if NORA engages an attorney or agency to work on a bundle of at least 30
lots. Our discussions with local attorneys indicate that a title agency would be
willing to accept a flat fee of approximately $2,000 per lot for such a project,
so long as NORA pays all court costs.54 Court costs are highly variable, but we
estimate NORA should expect per lot costs to average $15,000.55
The first strategy--Title Clearance for Sale at Auction--involves NORA
engaging a title agency in a performance-based contract much like the
contracts NORA already issues to local title agencies for its LLT properties.
Under this strategy, however, the title agency will work to clear the titles to
NORA’s non-LLT properties in strong markets. The idea here is that NORA
could then auction these properties via its existing auction strategy and use
the resulting income to repay the title agencies.

52

53
54
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Arizona Department of Financial Institutions. 2014. Equity Title Agency Inc. General
Rules - 3/18/2014. Accessed April 20th, 2014. Available: http://www.azdfi.gov/		
Consumers/PublicRecords/Forms/Rate%20Filings/Equity_TItle_Agency_031814_		
RF.pdf, p. 6; Howensite, L. (2014, March 31). Title Attorney, Elkins PLC. (R. Bauer, E.
Oliver, & A. Monet, Interviewers)
Howensite, L. (2014, March 31). Title Attorney, Elkins PLC. (R. Bauer, E. Oliver, & A.
Monet, Interviewers)
Ibid.
The most significant court cost for these properties is the $31 cancellation fee per
inscription. This cost is also the most variable, with inscriptions per expropriated property potentially ranging from a dozen to several hundred. Fifteen thousand dollars, our
court cost estimate, would cover the removal of approximately 480 inscriptions. While
this figure is on the high end of the potential cost range, we feel it would behoove
NORA to stick with this or a similarly conservative estimate, given the variability of this
cost).
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The second strategy--Clustered Redevelopment—involves the use of SIBfinancing for catalytic redevelopment projects that incorporate clusters of
non-LLT lots in transitional markets. Together, these two strategies contribute
to NORA’s mission of blight reduction while also freeing up agency funds
formerly allocated to maintaining these non-LLT lots.

Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction
Strategy I: Title Clearance for Sale at Auction, is appropriate for expropriated
properties in relatively strong markets, as defined by the MVA analysis. Given
the demand for residential lots in these markets, NORA could potentially sell
these lots at auction once the authority has obtained a clear and marketable
title to the lots. Since these properties will be sold individually, they do not
need to be in clusters as do the lots identified for Strategy II. The sale of
these properties will result in immediate, income for NORA; we therefore
recommend that NORA implement this strategy first. The resulting revenue
could then be used to fund or supplement the authority’s other activities.

Title Clearance

Identification of Auctionable Properties
Our GIS analysis indicated that there are 43 properties appropriate for this
strategy. These 43 properties, identified in Figure 2 (and listed in Appendix D),
meet the criteria established in the analysis section: the lots are expropriated,
rather than adjudicated, and they are located in neighborhoods with MVA
rankings of A, B, or C. A map of NORA’s expropriated properties that are
located in strong markets is shown in Map 1.
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Funding Mechanism
It is unlikely that socially-minded investors will be interested in financing
title clearance for the market rate sale of properties to private individuals or
developers since investors usually prefer tangible projects and the social
benefit is unclear. As such, the SIB model is not an appropriate financing
mechanism for Strategy I. Instead, we recommend that NORA fund this
strategy through a straightforward, performance-based contract with a local
title agency. A performance-based contract allows the contract initiator to only
pay for work that has been completed. Thus, NORA will only pay the attorney
completing the title work on the authority’s behalf once they have completed
their work, and possibly, after the property is sold. The potential challenge
with this strategy is that attorneys or title agencies may be reluctant to agree
to delayed payment (payment upon the sale of the property). However, most
firms familiar with government contracts anticipate payment delays due to the
additional regulations and bureaucracy associated with them.
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The team recommends NORA issue a Request-for-Proposal (RFP) detailing
the nuances of the payment plan and choose an attorney or firm to engage
in title clearance for the properties. Based on our cost estimates, it will
cost approximately $700,000 if the contracted attorneys clear the title to all
43 properties ($17,000 per lot x 43 lots = $731,000). Upon clearance of a
property’s title, NORA should be able to sell the property at auction. NORA
tends to auction properties at prices well above $17,000 per lot, on average.
Once NORA receives payment for the property, the agency can pay the
attorneys for their work as dictated in the pay-for-performance contract,
while likely making a profit on the sale of most properties. In addition to this
immediate return on investment from the sale of properties, NORA will no
longer have annual maintenance and insurance costs for any properties sold.
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Strategy II: Clustered Redvelopment

Title Clearance

Although SIB-financing is not appropriate for title clearance alone, our
research and analysis indicates that NORA could potentially use SIB funding
to finance catalytic redevelopment projects in transitional markets. This
strategy, clustered redevelopment, is best suited for clusters of expropriated
properties in transitional markets--markets where there is not enough
demand for NORA to reasonably expect to auction off the properties on a
piecemeal basis, even if they had clear titles--but where a strategically-placed
redevelopment could spur neighborhood revitalization. Again, we define
transitional markets as those ranked in the MVA analysis as D or E.
From NORA’s perspective, the benefits of this strategy are two-fold. First,
it would finance title clearance services and potentially subsidize the
disposition of these difficult-to-sell properties, relieving NORA of its landbanking responsibility for these lots. Second, the program itself--the strategic
redevelopment of properties in transitional markets--supports NORA’s
mission. As such, the program also has the potential to attract investment
from socially minded lenders and foundations in a way that the first strategy-clearing titles for auction--does not. Given the challenges associated with
large-scale redevelopment projects in transitional markets, this approach will
likely require NORA to partner with or otherwise formally engage with a real
estate development entity to incentivize the purchase and redevelopment of
these lots.

Identification of Clusters for Redevelopment
In order to identify clusters of properties for which this strategy would be
appropriate, we conducted a spatial analysis that identified clusters--groups
of 4 or more non-LLT lots within a 200 meter radius of one another, including
at least two adjacent lots and excluding those that had already been identified
and selected for the sale at auction strategy--within the MVA’s D or E markets.
We initially sought to identify clusters of properties within commercial districts,
as NORA has engaged in commercial or mixed use redevelopment projects
in its efforts to catalyze neighborhood revitalization in the past. There were,
however, no bundles of properties that met our criteria and were also in a
commercial zoning district.
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It is, therefore, our recommendation that NORA draw on its recent experience
as the grant administrator for a $29.7 million Neighborhood Stabilization
Program 2 grant, and, much as it did during the NSP2 process, promote
neighborhood level revitalization through the subsidization of turn-key,
scattered-site residential development in strategically located neighborhoods.

Title Clearance

Although several clusters met our minimum criteria, we decided on four
clusters of properties in Broadmoor/Central City, Algiers (Whitney), 7th Ward/
St. Roch, and Florida/St. Claude. Map 2 (see map on next page) identifies
these neighborhoods. The clusters of expropriated/adjudicated lots depicted
in Map 2 represent prime targets for catalytic development projects because,
in addition to meeting the previously discussed criteria, they also contain
a significant number of (at minimum, 15) LLT-lots within their geographic
boundaries. It is beyond the scope of this report to make concrete
recommendations regarding NORA’s LLT properties, but it is worth noting that
having an abundance of LLT lots within the boundaries of the redevelopment
clusters will provide NORA with additional flexibility and leeway when deciding
on the details of its disposition strategy. Additionally, the majority of the lots
in these clusters fall into the City of New Orleans’ Place-Based Revitalization
Strategy’s target neighborhoods, as defined by the Office of Community
Development (OCD). OCD defined the boundaries of these place-based
target neighborhoods in order “to prioritize the availability of formerly blighted
properties into the city’s Soft Second Program.”56 By promoting catalytic
redevelopment projects in these neighborhoods, NORA can insure that its
activities complement and enhance the city’s place-based, blight reduction
strategies.
It is also worth noting here that one of the lots in the St. Roch cluster is an
adjudicated property, which would need to be sold at a tax sale--ideally to
NORA’s development partner--rather than incorporated in the title clearance
bundle. Although NORA cannot transfer a clear title for an adjudicated
property to the developer, it will be in the developer’s best interest, if the
developer wants to include an adjudicated property in the development,
to maintain the lot and acquire clear title through good faith acquisitive
prescription when possible.

56

City of New Orleans. 2014. Blight Reduction Report - January 2014. Accessed, April
20th, 2014. Available: http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Accountability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/, p. 19.
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Funding Mechanism
NORA could potentially finance the clustered development strategy through a
modified SIB model. However, for this strategy to work using SIB financing,
NORA would need to take on the responsibilities of the intermediary. Our
initial analysis suggests that the revenues from the sale of these properties, in
addition to the cost savings generated through maintenance cost reductions,
could potentially provide enough funding to pay for the title services
necessary to get these lots to a marketable condition. The structure of such a
model is depicted in Figure 2.
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This model does not include the evaluator typically seen in a SIB model.
As discussed in Section III (SIBs and Blight), the profit margins for blight
remediation projects tend to be too slim to reliably cover all of the transaction
costs typically associated with a full SIB model. Table 3, which summarizes
a preliminary financial feasibility analysis of this project, reveals tight profit
margins that rely on maintenance cost savings. Rather than attempting to
pay an outside evaluator, the foundational investor, could, in concert with
NORA staff, conduct performance monitoring and evaluation in-house.
Although this does not meet the rigorous evaluation standards promoted by
some SIB experts, NORA demonstrated its institutional capacity to deliver
timely and accurate compliance reporting as the grant administrator in the
recent NSP2 program. NORA could leverage this experience to negotiate a
cost-effective, in-house performance evaluation process with its institutional
investor.
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Title Clearance

Figure 2: Clustered Redevelopment SIB Financing Model

Again, whether such a project is feasible at all depends on NORA’s ability to
find a willing investor and a willing developer. NORA will need to structure this
deal so as to provide the developer with the financial returns he or she needs
for project feasibility, while also insuring that the project meets the social
outcomes we have to assume a socially-minded investor or foundation will
want to see.
As for the developer’s needs, given the high costs of scattered site residential
development and the limited residential demand in these markets, it is safe
to assume that NORA’s development partner will require an incentive to
purchase this relatively large bundle of properties. The discount should
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be substantial enough to cover the gap between the cost to build and
the price at which residential developments could feasibly be sold in
these neighborhoods. Although NORA will need to determine the actual
discount rate, for the purposes of our preliminary financial modeling, we
assumed that NORA would sell the properties for 50% of their appraised
value (a description of how we estimated average property values for each
neighborhood is in Appendix C). Similar to a wholesale-over-retail discount,
this 50% cost reduction serves as a subsidy that should help make the deal
feasible from the developer’s perspective.

Title Clearance

In order to attract socially minded investors, NORA should consider placing
some restrictions on to whom the developer can sell the properties. Requiring
the buyer to be a low or moderate income, first time homeowner, per the
NSP2 regulations, is appealing because it expands access to homeownership
opportunities in New Orleans. Such a requirement would, however, also
limit the pool of potential buyers. Since many low-income families have
trouble qualifying for a first mortgage and meeting the continued cost of
homeownership, this requirement would constrain the pool of demand. Also,
it would duplicate the efforts of the city’s soft second program and NORA’s
NSP2 program, which subsidized homeownership for households earning
below 80% AMI and 120% AMI, respectively. 57
NORA’s primary goal is to remove these lots from its inventory and
to stimulate neighborhood revitalization--not to necessarily expand
homeownership opportunities to low income households. As such, a more
appropriate requirement might be that the buyer fall within the 120% - 160%
AMI range. This income bracket has difficulty purchasing quality, market rate
homes in New Orleans, but was not served by the city’s soft second program
or the NSP2 program. NORA could attain community support and the interest
of investors by marketing this strategy as a workforce housing development
project. Also, serving the 120%-160% AMI bracket in these place-based
neighborhoods will insure that this project does not duplicate the efforts of the
NSP2 program or the city’s Soft Second Program.

57

City of New Orleans. 2014. Blight Reduction Report - January 2014. Accessed, April
20th, 2014. Available: http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Accountability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/, p. 19; New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority. 2013. Neighborhood Stabilization Program Phase 2 Report.
Accessed April 25th, 2014. Available: http://www.noraworks.org/public/files/generaluploads/NORA_NSP2-July_2013_Report.pdf
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Table 3 summarizes a preliminary financial feasibility analysis of this project.
With a total of 48 lots, title clearance services for this bundle of properties will
require an upfront investment of $816,000. Again, the actual discount applied
to the property’s sale price is flexible. But, if we assume NORA sells these
properties for approximately 50% of their appraised value, their sale could
result in total revenue generation of $647,493. Including the cost savings
generated by NORA’s reduced maintenance costs over a 10-year period, the
disposition of these lots would generate approximately $855,000 in revenue.
That cost savings provides an investor with a 4.89% return.

Title Clearance

This model should serve as a starting point for NORA as the agency moves
forward in developing a concrete disposition strategy and identifying investor
and development partners. One of the local, non-profit developers that NORA
has worked with in the past would be an excellent development partner.
NORA could approach Goldman Sachs—which, as indicated in Case Study
1, is already active in the field of SIB-financing—as a potential investor. The
Ford Foundation is another potential investor; the Ford Foundation remains
active in real estate-based grant funding in the New Orleans area.58

58

Crescent City Community Land Trust. 2014. Our Partners. Accessed April 27th, 2014.
Available: http://www.ccclt.org/?page_id=114
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Table 3: Potential Revenue from Redevelopment Clusters
Broadmoor/
7th Ward/ Florida/St.
Whitney
Total
Central City
St. Roch
Claude
Lots
Title clearance costs/
lot
Flat fee
Average court costs
Total title clearance
costs for bundle
(Investment)
Market rate sale price
per lot
Discount
Revenue from sale of
bundle

Title Clearance Costs
31
7

6*

4

48

($17,000)

($17,000)

($17,000)

($17,000)

($17,000)

($2,000)
($15,000)

($2,000)
($15,000)

($2,000)
($15,000)

($2,000)
($15,000)

($2,000)
($15,000)

($527,000)

($119,000)

($102,000)

($68,000)

Revenue from Sales
$21,333

$43,216

$32,587

$33,907

50%

50%

50%

50%

$330,662

$151,256

$97,761

$67,814

$647,493

Savings from Redevelopment
$15,500

$3,500

$3,000

$2,000

$24,000

Present value of
10 years’ worth of
savings**

$134,578

$30,389

$26,047

$17,365

$208,378

TOTAL REVENUE /
COST SAVINGS
RETURN ON
INVESTMENT

Title Clearance

Annual property
maintenance cost
savings ($500/lot)

Total Revenue and Costs Savings
$465,239

$181,645

$123,808

$85,179

$855,871

-11.72%

52.64%

21.38%

25.26%

4.89%

Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis

*Note that there are actually 7 lots in this bundle but, as discussed previously, one of these is
an adjudicated lot that would need to be sold to the developer at a tax sale. Given the uncertainty regarding whether or not NORA’s development partners will decide to purchase this lot,
revenues associated with its sale--which would be limited-- are not included in the model.
** In estimating the cost savings associated with reduced maintenance costs, we assumed
that the sale of one lot would result in annual savings of $500 for a total of $27,500 per year.
We then calculated the present value of ten years’ worth of savings, using the current treasury bond interest rate (2.77%, compounded semi-annually), as a discount rate.
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ALTERNATIVE LAND
MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES

NORA spends roughly $500 per lot annually to manage, maintain and
insure property in its possession. Due to the continued maintenance costs
NORA faces, and the lack of immediate options for the properties being
analyzed in this section, the team recommends that NORA work to expand its
alternative land management strategies. By changing the use or maintenance
requirements of property, NORA can not only save money, but also create
viable environmental solutions that benefit the neighborhoods in which these
projects are located.
The strategies discussed in this section are appropriate for properties that are
not suitable for auction or packaging for a residential or commercial project
given the difficulty of identifying a viable title clearance strategy. Though there
are two strategies, the team is recommending the expansion of stormwater
management and community partnerships.The stormwater management
strategy involves the use of an SIB partnership with Sewerage and Water
Board (S&WB), where NORA land reduces stress on the pumping system
and has a positive environmental impact by converting vacant properties into
stormwater depositories.The lot leasing strategy involves the use of a pay for
success model in which an intermediary is incentivized to expand the Growing
Green program. This strategy reduces NORA’s cost on lot maintenance and
insurance while also creating a stream of revenue.

Alternative Land Management

Strategy III: Stormwater Management
NORA has taken the initiative to improve the City of New Orleans’ stormwater
management by implementing green infrastructure projects on their vacant
properties and including best management practices into their construction
procedures. The Pontilly Stormwater Management Hazard Mitigation
project is a prime example of how NORA was able to reduce runoff and
flooding in the Pontilly neighborhood through collaborative efforts with
architecture and engineering firms. NORA’s stormwater management
strategy is complementary to the goals of the S&WB. S&WB is currently
under a consent decree issued by the Environmental Protection Agency,
which mandates that it improve its pumping stations to be able to operate
simultaneously at peak flow periods in order to prevent inland flooding and
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pre-treated wastewater discharge into the East Bank Collection System.59
Currently the S&WB has paid $1,500,000 plus interest in fines for noncompliance.60 In addition to penalty fees, the EPA mandated the S&WB to
spend a minimum of $2,000,000 to improve the water quality through the
Supplemental Environmental Project.61 A partnership between NORA and
the S&WB could assist the S&WB with meeting the objectives indicated in
the consent decree, avoiding costly penalties, while also alleviating NORA of
the burden of maintaining some of the vacant properties in its portfolio. The
creation of stormwater infrastructure on vacant properties in areas with a high
risk of flooding will assist in supporting the mission of the S&WB by improving
the water quality, a major goal of the consent decree, while serving NORA’s
revitalization objectives.

Identification of Stormwater Management Properties

59

60
61
62

63

Alternative Land Management

Desire/St. Roch and the Lower Ninth Ward contained the most properties
that are highly suitable for stormwater management (Map 3). The study
team identified 13 properties for stormwater management development
in the Desire/ St. Roch community.62 In the Lower Ninth Ward, the study
team identified 30 lots. According to the City of New Orleans Neighborhood
Rebuilding Plan (CNONRP) for the St. Roch Community, created after 2005,
properties located between St. Claude and N. Miro St. “received between
1 and 4 feet of flood water” due to Hurricane Katrina.63 In the Lower Ninth
Ward, homes built in the 1950s received over 8 feet of water due to storm
surge from Hurricane Katrina as reported in the Lower Ninth Ward Planning

U.S. District Court-Eastern District of Louisiana New Orleans Division, 2013. United
States of America (plaintiff), League of Women Voters of New Orleans, et al. (plaintiff)
v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, and the City of New Orleans (defendants), State of Louisiana (defendant), Civil Action NO. 93-3212 Section “S” Mag.
1, Second Modified Consent Decree. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans.
Retrieved on March 17, 2014. Available: http://www.swbno.org/docs_consentdecree.
asp
Ibid.
Ibid.
Brown, Deron, Bermello-Ajamil & Partners, Inc, Hewitt, Lonnie, Hewitt-Washington,
Inc., Sanchez, Alfredo St. Martin - Brown & Associates, LLP, St. Martin, Joseph, No
Date.St. Roch Neighborhood Planning District 7 Rebuilding Plan. City of New Orleans. Retrieved on April 14, 2014. Available: http://nolanrp.com/data/neighborhood/
district_7_final_stroch.pdf
Ibid.
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District Rebuilding Plan.64 Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the drainage systems in
the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Roch communities were in very poor condition
and Hurricane Katrina only exacerbated them.65 Thus, the stormwater
management project will assist the Desire/ St. Roch and Lower Ninth Ward
communities in meeting the S&WB’s goal of improving their drainage systems.

Alternative Land Management

Funding Mechanism
Utilizing SIBs to fund the maintenance costs for NORA’s vacant properties will
alleviate the financial strain placed on undedicated capital. A SIB partnership
between NORA and the S&WB would provide the opportunity for NORA to
reduce its maintenance responsibility for vacant properties, for the S&WB
to meet its goals indicated in the consent decree, and improve the quality
of life for the residents of New Orleans. In a SIB structural model, NORA
and the S&WB would enter into a contract where NORA would provide
a designated amount of vacant properties (determined by NORA) for
stormwater management projects (Figure 3). Financing for the project would
come from private investors and the S&WB. GNO, Inc., and the Greater
New Orleans Foundation might serve as potential investors for this particular
project. GNO, Inc. funded the Greater New Orleans Urban Water Plan and
the Greater New Orleans Foundation has demonstrated an interest in working
with environmental issues affecting the Greater New Orleans area.66 The
study team identified Waggoner & Ball Architects and the LSU School of
Architecture as prospective service providers who could create and implement
stormwater management plans for the designated vacant lots. In this model,
the S&WB can serve as the project manager to ensure compliance with
requirements of the consent decree and to ensure timely completion of the
projects.
Over a five to ten-year period, which is the average timeframe of an
SIB model, the S&WB, private, institutional, or nonprofit organizations
collaborating in this program would absorb the maintenance costs of these
64

65
66

Bermello-Ajamil & Partners, Inc., Sanchez, Alfredo, Hewitt-Washington, Inc.,Hewitt,
Lonnie, No Date. Lower Ninth Ward Planning District Rebuilding Plan. City of New
Orleans. Retrieved on April 14, 2014. Available: http://www.nolaplans.com/plans/Lambert%20Intermediate/District_8_Plan_FINAL%20PLAN%20REPORT%20Lower%20
Ninth%20Ward-10-03-06.pdf
Brown, et al.
GNO, Inc. 2011. Greater New Orleans, Inc. The Greater New Orleans Urban Water
Plan. Retrieved on April 11, 2014. Available: http://gnoinc.org/initiatives/the-greaternew-orleans-water-plan/
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lots. NORA will save $500 per lot per year. In addition, reduced flooding
would improve neighborhood stabilization and potentially increase disposition
of other NORA properties. The S&WB would define the outcomes such as
improved water quality, improved drainage, and potentially decreased demand
on pumping stations.

Alternative Land Management

For this option to be viable, NORA would need to facilitate the conversation
and the process to create a SIB vehicle. NORA would need to demonstrate
to the S&WB the cost-benefit of pursuing green infrastructure in addition to
their existing RFP, which funds $500,000 for green infrastructure projects per
year for five years. The staff resources necessary for obtaining investor buy-in
required for SIBs without guaranteed outcomes could discourage S&WB from
entering into a SIB partnership with NORA. Another challenge is ensuring
that progress made meets S&WB requirements. If service providers do not
achieve requirements, then investors would not receive a return on their
investment allocated by the S&WB. Lastly, NORA must identify who would be
responsible for the maintenance of the stormwater management lots once the
SIB term has expired.
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Figure 3: Stormwater Management SIB Financing Model

Alternative Land Management
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Strategy IV: Lot Leasing
NORA is currently making advancements in the field of alternative land
management. The Growing Green program has produced 11 community
partnerships with groups who, in exchange for the use of NORA-owned
land, pay a lease fee and become responsible for the upkeep of the lots
used. In the current model, an intermediary group connects community
groups in need of land to NORA lots. The community groups pay an annual
rental fee to NORA of $250 plus property insurance on leased lots. These
community partnerships have the potential to generate revenue and provide
substantial cost savings for NORA, while also contributing to community
revitalization. We are proposing NORA expand the Growing Green program
through a pay-for-performance model, in which NORA pays an intermediary
group a percentage of the revenues and cost savings from entering lots into
community partnerships. The study group analyzed the 310 properties to
determine which would be most suitable for the expansion of the Growing
Green program. Upon completion of this analysis, the study steam modeled
the potential use of pay-for-success contracts in expanding NORA’s Growing
Green program. The following two sections detail the properties identified as
most appropriate for the Growing Green program and the financial mechanism
to support the program.

Alternative Land Management

Identification of Lot Leasing Properties
Based on the mapping analysis, the study team identified 157 properties
suitable for lot leasing through the Growing Green program clustered in
the Lower Ninth Ward/ Holy Cross neighborhoods and the McDonough
neighborhood (Map 4). These neighborhoods contain many vacant and
blighted, due to lack of upkeep after Hurricane Katrina.

Funding Mechanism
The expansion of the Growing Green program has the potential to create
additional revenue and cost savings for NORA, while promoting NORA’s goals
of community partnership and neighborhood revitalization. NORA’s current
model involves an intermediary that connects nonprofits, community groups,
or individuals with approved projects to NORA properties. In this model, the
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Alternative Land Management

intermediary is an unpaid mission-driven organization that benefits from its
partnership with NORA through having the opportunity to connect groups and
individuals with land at a low cost, serving its overall mission. NORA benefits
by passing on the maintenance and insurance costs of selected properties
to community groups. Further, the development of projects such as urban
farms on these lots has the potential to bring added social and revitalization
benefits to targeted neighborhoods. Community groups benefit through the
opportunity to lease NORA-owned land at a cost of $250 per year plus the
cost of insurance. At the end of the lease term, groups may also have the
opportunity to purchase the lots. Since its development, Growing Green has
served to connect eleven community groups and individuals with NORA lots,
bringing innovative community projects into New Orleans neighborhoods. In
the coming year, NORA hopes to work with the intermediary organization in
expanding the program to more than 100 NORA-owned lots. However, this
model may be limited because the intermediary lacks financially incentive to
increase partnerships on NORA lots and thus may not end up expanding the
Growing Green program to its full potential.
The study team sees high potential for revenues and cost savings with the
continued expansion of the Growing Green program. In particular, we see
the opportunity for NORA to expand the program to reach and go beyond
the goal of 100 community partnerships through financially incentivizing the
success of the intermediary. The team proposes a performance-based model,
in which NORA would pay the intermediary a percentage of cost savings and
revenues for lots it enters into the care of community partners. This model of
the Growing Green program is similar to NORA’s existing model. However,
the Growing Green program incentivizes the intermediary group involved
through payments to increase the number of lots in community partnerships.
NORA pays the intermediary only for lots that it enters into successful
community partnerships. Continued payment of a portion of the revenues and
cost savings from these lots further incentivizes the intermediary to maintain
existing partnerships. Success could be determined by the group’s fulfillment
of the lease requirements or by other more specific measures specified
by NORA. Specifically, the group’s ongoing maintenance of the property
and implementation of appropriate projects should be significant in the
determination of successful partnerships and in payments to the intermediary.
We detail the financial mechanism and potential cost savings that NORA could
incur through the incorporation of a performance-based model for Growing
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Green in Table 4. Through the mapping analysis, the study team identified
157 of the expropriated and adjudicated properties that have high potential
for use in the Growing Green program. NORA currently receives no revenue
from these lots, and NORA pays insurance and maintenance costs at a rate of
$500 per year on each lot. As displayed in Table 4, NORA will spend almost
$900,000 on these lots over a ten-year period. The study team modeled the
use of a performance-based contract in which the 157 lots identified in the
mapping analysis were placed in community partnerships through Growing
Green over a 10-year period. By year five we assume the intermediary will
have placed all 157 lots in community partnerships. Combined revenues
and cost savings over a ten-year period total over $1 million. According to
the model, NORA would pay the intermediary 25 percent of cost savings and
revenues during each year that each lot is being maintained by a community
partner, a rate that could be altered according to NORA’s needs. In this
model, NORA achieves an adjusted savings of more than $800,000, with
a return on investment of 2.0. Further benefits that the model is unable to
account for include social benefits and neighborhood revitalization promoted
by the community activities taking place on the 157 lots.

Alternative Land Management
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Table 4: Potential Revenue and Cost Savings From Lot Leasing

Alternative Land Management

STATUS QUO

Y1
Y5
Y10
Total
Status Quo Revenue
Lots Leased
0
0
0
0
Revenue
$
- $
- $
- $
Status Quo Costs
Insurance
($7,850)
($8,835) ($10,242) ($89,991)
Maintenance
($70,650) ($79,517) ($92,182) ($809,923)
Total Status Quo Costs
($899,915)
Total Status Quo Net Income/Loss
($78,500) ($88,352) ($102,425) ($899,915)
WITH LOT LEASING PAY FOR
PERFORMANCE STRATEGY
Y1
Y5
Y10
Total
Revenue With Lot Leasing Pay for Performance Strategy
Lots Leased
30
157
157
157
Revenue
$7,500
$42,485
$46,907
$346,049
Costs With Lot Leasing Pay for Performance Strategy
Insurance
($6,350) $ $($16,921)
Maintenance
($57,150) $ $($152,290)
Total Costs with Lot Leasing Strategy
($169,211)
Net Income/ Loss with Lot Leasing
($56,000)
$42,485
$46,907
$176,838
Overall Cost Savings and Revenues
$22,500 $130,838 $149,332 $1,076,753
PAYMENT TO INTERMEDIARY (at 25%
($5,625) ($32,709) ($37,333) ($269,188)
of combined revenue and cost savings)
ADJUSTED NET INCOME/LOSS
$16,875
$98,128
$111,999
$807,564
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

Source: UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analyisis

*This model assumes that the intermediary would enter 157 of the 300 expropriated and adjudicated properties under study into community partnerships over the first five years of the lot
leasing program. It assumes that NORA’s maintenance costs per lot are $500 per year and that
revenues for lots leased are $250 per year. Revenues are increased at 2% per year and costs
are increased at 3% per year.
**This model assumes that lots put into community partnerships will remain in community partnerships for the duration of the ten-year period, when in reality the length of time lots remain in
community partnerships may vary.
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NEXT STEPS

Through our research and analysis, we developed four strategies, as seen
below in Map 5, to support NORA’s mission to reduce blight and revitalize
neighborhoods in New Orleans. These strategies—title clearance for sale at
auction, clustered redevelopment, stormwater management, and lot easing-involve varying levels of commitment and funding by NORA, as well as relationship-building with investors, intermediaries, and other partners. We recommend SIB-financing for clustered development and stormwater management
and a performance-based contract for title clearance and lot leasing. In order
to make these strategies actionable, we detail the next steps needed to initiate
their successful implementation.

Strategy I – Title Clearance for Sale at Auction

Next Steps

In order to implement Strategy I, NORA should first conduct its own ad-hoc
market valuation analysis in order to confirm that the potential sale prices of
the 43 lots included in Strategy I can adequately cover the estimated $17,000
per lot, title clearance costs. Although historically, lots in these relatively strong
markets sell for prices in excess of $17,000, as indicated by NORA’s recent
auction history, the sale prices can be highly variable on a per lot basis. Given
NORA’s more detailed knowledge of the real estate markets in which these
lots are located, the agency should be equipped to conduct an in-house, high
level market valuation analysis to estimate the potential sales prices of these
lots. Alternatively, NORA could commission a private firm to conduct a study,
although doing so would, of course, present additional costs.
Once NORA has confirmed the number of and location of lots that it wishes
to include in this strategy, the agency should craft a Request for Proposals
(RFP) that details the services required of a title agency, as well as the payment structure of the pay-for-performance contract. Again, these services
will include title clearance—a relatively straight forward process for expropriated properties—and NORA will cover the costs of the court fees. NORA may
want to first reach out to the title attorneys with which the agency has existing
relationships, in order to gauge their willingness to engage in a pay-for-performance contract in which their payment is tied to the sale of the lots.
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Strategy II – Clustered Redevelopment
Just as NORA will likely need to draw on its own resources to conduct the
market valuation necessary to confirm sales prices of the properties in Strategy I, it should also do so for confirming the location of and number of properties in the redevelopment clusters for Strategy II. More generally, NORA may
want to consider re-defining the clusters identified for catalytic redevelopment,
so as to include some LLT lots. Doing so could help increase the scale of the
project, refine the geographic boundaries of the clusters to be more in line
with market demand as assessed by NORA, and help to remove additional
lots from NORA’s inventory. For instance, the Florida/St.Claude neighborhood has relatively high property values and dozens of LLT lots, but it has the
smallest cluster—only 4—of non-LLT properties. By incorporating 10-15 of the
LLT properties located geographically within the boundaries of the Florida/St.
Claude cluster into this strategy, NORA could remove these properties from
its inventory while also providing its development partner and the investor with
greater participation incentives. Both the development partner and the investor will be attracted to the larger scale of the project, and because these properties can sell at relatively high rates, their inclusion will increase both entities’
return on investment (ROI).
Once NORA has solidified its priority clusters for redevelopment, it should
begin reaching out to potential development partners and investors. Prior to
issuing a formal RFP, NORA may want to informally approach developers
whom the agency has worked with in the past, or institutional investors and
foundations with which NORA has an existing relationship. Again, we recommend that NORA approach the Ford Foundation, which continues to be active
in real estate based philanthropy in New Orleans, and Goldman Sachs, which
has aggressively pursued and promoted the SIB model elsewhere.

Next Steps

Strategy III – Stormwater Management
NORA has an existing relationship with the S&WB. The first step in initiating
a stormwater management SIB is to expand this relationship by approaching
the S&WB regarding the SIB model. NORA may want to informally reach out
to the S&WB initially, to gauge their interest in taking on stormwater maintenance responsibilities for additional lots (those identified lots in the Desire/
St. Roch and the Lower Ninth Ward Communities). NORA should consider
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presenting the S&WB staff with this report or a brief overview of its findings
introducting the SIB concept and the potential benefits that a SIB-financed
stormwater management program could provide for both entities.
If the S&WB expresses interest, NORA should pursue conversations with potential investors and service providers. The study team identified GNO, Inc.,
and the Greater New Orleans Foundation as potential investors for a stormwater management SIB, and Waggoner & Ball Architects and LSU School of
Architecture as prospective service providers. NORA could make the initial
introductions between key personal at these organizations; it will be up to the
S&WB, however, as the intermediately, to engage formally with the investors
and service providers.

Strategy IV – Lot Leasing
The first step initiating a pay-for-performance model that expands upon the
Growing Green program is to pursue conversation with potential green intermediaries. NORA could begin by approaching its existing, mission-driven
intermediary, and informally assessing whether the intermediary—if given
additional incentives—has the resources necessary to expand the program.
If not, the next step in implementing this strategy would be for NORA to write
and issue a RFP for a new green intermediary.

Next Steps
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The bond hopes to raise $8 $9 million of investment capital
from the private sector and
philanthropic partners. Initial
returns are estimated at 2%
annually over a five year term
The California Endowment,
which already provides grant
funding to help low-income
asthma patients, will help plan
a Social Impact Bond to bring
proven project to scale.
$27 million invested by primary
investor Goldman Sachs and
an $11.7 million Department
of Labor grant fund some
repayments. The state will pay
5% annual interest during the
life of the project to Goldman
Sachs and upwards of 2% to
secondary investors.
Initial investment made by
Goldman Sachs for $9.6
million, most of which was
secured by Bloomberg
Philanthropies If the program
is successful over a four year
period, Goldman will make
$2.1 million, almost a 25%
return

The intervention would aim to meet
the housing and mental health
needs of homeless mothers. The
partnership would include the
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing
Authority and Frontline Service, a
mental health service provider.
About 200 lower-income children
with asthma are involved in a twoyear project to show the financial
benefits of asthma management

Intervention model combines
outreach, intensive case
management, life skills,
educational, pre-vocational and
employment training, and work
opportunities.

Investment will fund service
providers who will carry out the
Adolescent Behavioral Learning
Experience (ABLE). This program
focuses on education and support
to adolescents who have recently
left Rikers Island and seeks to
reduce the recidivism rate by 20%

To decrease
the number of
children from
homeless
families entering
the foster care
system

Childhood
asthma
management

Reduce
recidivism rates
among high-risk
young men

Reduce
recidivism at
Rikers Island
amongst
adolescent
inmates

Cuyahoga
County, Ohio

Fresno,
California

State of
Massachusetts

New York City,
NY

UNITED STATES EXAMPLES

Strategy

Financial Structure

Phone:
(212) 532-3200

MDRC New York (intermediary)

Email/Phone:
john_ward@rocainc.com
(617) 913-2398

John Ward – Roca Inc.

617-939-9900 x 25

Phone:

Social Finance, US

Kate Manning Kennedy

Phone:
216-443-7178

Cuyahoga County, Executive Dir.
Fitzgerald

Contact
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Goal

Location
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Private investment of $13.5
million was provided by Merrill
Lynch. Upon success of the
program, the U.S. Dept. of
Labor makes payments on the
first half of the loan term (5.5
years). New York State makes
payments on the second half.
Returns are capped at 12.5%.
Goldman Sachs made the
initial investment of $4.6
million. Each year a student
in the program does not need
special education services,
a $2,600 cost savings is
generated to the state school
system. Utah then makes
repayments to Goldman plus
5% interest.

Fixed repayment structure.
Bonds are secured by the
investor’s assets (including its
property portfolio).
£10 million was initially
provided by over 700 individual
investors. The cost savings
generated by the success
of the program returns 4%
annually to investors on a five
year term.

Provide support and employment
opportunities for formerly
incarcerated individuals. The
program seeks to reduce recidivism
among state facilities by 8% as
well as decrease unemployment
amongst participants by 5%.

Deliver high impact and targeted
curriculum to increase school
readiness and academic
performance among pre-K
students, reducing the need for
special education and therefore
creating a cost savings for schools.
Participants are measured though
standardized vocabulary tests

Creating jobs for ex-offenders
and other long-term unemployed
people through the repair and
refurbishment of empty properties.
Bond will fund the acquisition and
adaptation of up to 30 freehold
properties across England and
Wales which should house up to 80
tenants for life.

Reduce the rate
of recidivism
among at-risk
individuals

Fund early
childhood
education
program

Reduce
unemployment,
recidivism and
vacant properties

Housing for
individuals
with learning
disabilities

New York State

State of Utah

Bristol,
England, United
Kingdom

England and
Wales, United
Kingdom

INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES

Financial Structure

Strategy

Goal

Location

Email:
enquiries@glh.org.uk

Golden Lane Housing (service
provider)

Email:
paul@bristoltogether.co.uk

Paul Harrod, Director, The
Together Group,

Email:
janis@utahchildren.org

Janis Dubno. Senior Early
Childhood Education Analyst – Salt
Lake City, UT.

Phone:
212-422-4430

Center of Employment
Opportunities – New York City, NY.

Contact
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Financial Structure

£3.1 million investment made
by the Big Lottery Fund and
Big Society Capital. Investors
can expect returns between
8 and 12% over a five year
period.

The UK Government has
provided a £400 million grant
for preventing homelessness
across the country. The
Government is also providing
£18.5million for councils to
help tackle and prevent rough
sleeping among single people.
The city of London is required
to contribute £5 million upon
success of the program
£20 million Social Outcomes
Fund was created to pay for
outcomes on SIBs where
an intervention is valuable
in terms of public sector
savings, but where no single
commissioner makes enough
savings to make all of the
outcome payments. This is not
an example that includes a
private investor.

Strategy

Program focuses on 11-16 year
olds so that they can safely remain
at home with their families, with the
aim of substantial improvements
in their long term outcomes. The
bond will fund an intervention called
Multi-Systemic Therapy which
works to improve parenting and
build positive relationships within
the family and between the family
and the wider community.

Two shelters are commissioned
to provide a range of services to
an 800 person cohort of people
who experience stressful sleeping
situations. Services include
employment, health, and stable
accommodation support.

The bond will fund a program that
enables local authorities to provide
solutions for foster children who
experience displacement or are
in need of health care or special
education.

To fund
prevention
programs for
vulnerable
adolescents in
or at the edge of
foster care.

Improve
outcomes
for homeless
population

Improve the lives
of local foster
children

Essex, England
UK

London,
England, UK

Manchester,
England, UK

Phone/Email:
mcsreply@manchester.gov.uk
0161 234 5001

Manchester City Council, Social
Care

Phone/email:
+44 (0) 207 667 6370
info@socialfinance.org.uk

Social Finance UK (intermediary)

Phone/email:
+44 (0) 207 667 6370
info@socialfinance.org.uk

Social Finance UK (intermediary)

Contact
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Goal

Reduce
unemployment
recidivism and
vacant properties;
Based on Bristol,
UK SIB

Reunite children
that are in foster
care with their
families and
prevent children
from entering into
foster care

Location

Midlands,
England, UK

New South
Wales, Australia

The bond will finance the purchase,
renovation, and reselling of approx.
15 properties per year. Through
the constant cycling of capital,
investments of over £2 million will
be made into the wages, training
and mentoring of 100-150 exoffenders. Success of the program
will be determined by four different
measures (public safety, education,
property, and other)
The bond will fund the expansion
of UnitingCare Burnside’s Newpin
program which aims to break
the destructive cycle of family
relationships that lead to abuse
and neglect. By providing intensive
support to improve parenting styles,
behavior and practices, the program
helps parents to build positive
parent-child relationships. This
support provides economic benefits
in the form of less Government
spending.

Strategy

Initial investment of $7million
to be repaid over a seven
year term. Minimum return of
5% to the primary investor for
the first 3 years. The investor
enjoys principal protection of
75% during years 1-3, and
50% during years 4-7. Early
termination right for poor
performance can occur after
year three.

£3 million has been invested
by Triodos Bank who seeks
philanthropic investors to
bolster the bond. Future
investors will have to
make minimum a minimum
investment of £0.25 million to
enjoy 6% interest rates and
qualify for tax relief.

Financial Structure

Email/Phone:
ilearmonth@socialventures.com.au
02 8004 6729

Ian Learmonth- Social Ventures
Australia

Email:
info@midlandstogether.co.uk

Richard Nicol, CEO, Midlands
Together,

Contact
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF REPORT INTERVIEWS
Auw, Jeremy. Planning Student, Harvard University. SIBs and blight in Detroit. Brooke
Perry. 3 April 2014. Phone interview.
Brown, Christina. Clinical Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.
Utilizing law students for title clearance. Joe Legaux. 7 April 2014. In person
interview.
Bush, Phillip. Senior Program Director of Advisory Services at Enterprise Community
Partners. Information on the financing of blight remediation. 24 March 2014.
Phone Interview.
Chaskel, Sebastian. Program Manager, SIB Lab at Harvard University John F.
Kennedy School of Government. Information from SIB Lab. Karl Tear. 26 Febru
ary 2014. Phone interview.
Graves, Jerry. Director of Land Stewardship, New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.
Gathering information from NORA on alternative land management. Tierra An
thony, Bryant Dixon and Jessica Fisch. 20 March 2014. In-person interview.
Howenstine, Laurie. Title Attorney at Elkins, PLC. Information on the process of title
clearance and laws. Rachael Bauer, et al. 27 March 2014. In person interview.
Knudsen, Seth and David Lessinger. Project Manager and Director of Planning and
Strategy, New Orleans Redevelopment Authority. Gathering information from
New Orleans Redevelopment Authority. Jessica Fisch, et al. 26 March 2014. In
person interview.
Littlefield, Casey. Associate at Social Finance. Brooke Perry. 20 March 2014. Phone
interview.
Perry, Erin. Executive Assistant at Nashville Downtown Partnership. Courtney Smith.
28 February 2014. Phone interview.
Roman, John. Senior Fellow at Justice Policy Center. Potential for SIBs in place-		
based initiatives. Karl Tear. 7 March 2014. Phone interview.
Snyderman, Robin and Karen Muchin. Principals at BRicK Partners, LLC. BRicK Part
ners' interest in social impact bonds. Joe Legaux and Brooke Perry. 25 Febru
ary 2014. Phone Interview.
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APPENDIX C - COMPARABLE PROPERTY SALE PRICES
The team compiled potential sale prices using recent NORA auction prices
and zip code data from the New Orleans Metropolitan Association of Realtors
between March 23, 2014 and Nov. 2, 2013. An average of several lots and the
average sale price of damaged homes in Central City is $26,526 per lot. The
St. Claude area should warrant an average of $33,907 per lot. The 7th Ward/
St. Roch section warrants $32,587 per lot. The team could not recover data
on any recent Algiers’ auctions so the $32,587 price was determined based
solely off zip code data.

Location

Central City Sold Comparables
Property Type
Sale Price

2514 S Derbigny

Structure

$53,000 (Above Claiborne)

2613 S Saratoga

Lot

$10,000 (Below Claiborne)

2618 S Saratoga

Lot

$9,000 (Below Claiborne)

2818 St. Andrew

Structure

$12,000

2844 Dryades

Lot

$20,000

70113 Average Damaged Sale
2013

$24,000

70125 Average Damaged Sale
2013

$57,685

Price for Model (Average)

$26,526

Location

St. Claude Sold Properties
Property Type
Sale Price

2333 Pauline

Structure

$23,000

4523 Urquhart

Structure

$35,000

1707 Congress

Structure

$32,000

1503 Lesseps

Structure

$22,000

70117 Average Damaged Sale
2013

$57,537

Price for Model (Average)

$33,907
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Location

7th Ward Sold Comparables
Property Type
Sale Price

2115 Mandeville

Structure

$20,000

2133 Port

Structure

$17,000

1615 St. Roch

Structure

$38,000

70116 Average Damaged Sale
2013

$55,350

Price for Model (Average)

$32,587

Location

Algiers Sold Comparables
Sale Price

70114 Average Damaged Sale 2013

$43,216

Price for Model

$43,216
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type

Identifier

File Address

Owner Name

2014 Total
Value

Tax Bill Number

Adjudicated

NOR900354

2200 GORDON ST

WARREN E J JR;
WARREN JOYCE;
WARREN TROY;
CYPRIAN DEBRA W

Adjudicated

NOR900389

2122-2124 PAUGER ST

HUDSON JOHN R

Adjudicated

NOR900412

3621-3623 THIRD ST

DIGGS PETER

$33,900

412404623

Adjudicated

NOR900413

3617-3619 THIRD ST

DIGGS PETER

$8,700

412404616

Adjudicated

NOR900414

3625-3627 THIRD ST

SUTTON RICHARD

$9,300

412404618

$910

207106910

$3,800

39W510820

$8,100

37W105817

Adjudicated

NOR900503

1718-1720 ST. ANN ST

WOMEN
ENTREPRENEURS
FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INC

Adjudicated

NOR900518

4521 FLAKE AVE

DUNN WILL D
DUNN DELEGER B

$6,100

39W907711

Adjudicated

NOR900553

1520 CLOUET ST

LAWRENCE ADORA G

$1,020

39W400620

Adjudicated

NOR900558

701 ANDRY ST

WINFREY HENRY S

$1,020

39W109527

Adjudicated

NOR900598

3215 RABBITS ST

NORA

$420

38W209102

Adjudicated

NOR900620

47538 FORSTALL ST (1718
FORSTALL)

NORU

$390

39W409605

Adjudicated

NOR900628

4517-4519 ROBERTSON ST

NORU

$9,440

614332709

Adjudicated

NOR900631

48146 LIZARDI ST

LELONG F RIVERS

$530

39W502221

Adjudicated

NOR900697

2441 DELERY

NORU

$550

39W604312  

Adjudicated

NOR900720

1628 FORSTALL ST

Ulmer Charles

$390

39W405307  

Expropriated

NOR900334

1217 S SARATOGA ST

NORA

$ 13,000

102107107

Expropriated

NOR900335

1308 S SARATOGA ST

NORA

$ 26,500

102106809

Expropriated

NOR900336

2066 N JOHNSON ST

NORA

$ 1,800

37W112925

Expropriated

NOR900339

6437 MARQUE ST

NORA

$ 4,200

39W212515

Expropriated

NOR900340

2412 CLARA ST

NORA

$690

412304706

Expropriated

NOR900341

2919 GRAVIER ST

NORA

$18,000

105203603

Expropriated

NOR900343

3209 GRAVIER ST

NORA

$18,800

105205903

Expropriated
Expropriated

NOR900344
NOR900345

1213 N ROCHEBLAVE ST
2413 GRAVIER ST

NORA
NORA

$5,800
$24,500

208108118
105201404

Expropriated

NOR900346

1320 WILLOW ST

NORA

$1,600

102201809

Expropriated

NOR900347

2008 SPAIN ST

NORA

$8,100

38W110514

Expropriated
Expropriated

NOR900348
NOR900353

3221 SECOND ST
3108 GRAVIER ST

NORA
NORA

$16,700
$30,000

412401913
104106818

Expropriated

NOR900355

50330 FLORIDA AVE

NORA

$2,000

39W615332

Expropriated

NOR900356

1131 S DUPRE ST

NORA

$7,000

102205401

Expropriated

NOR900357

3101 PINE ST

NORA

$10,800

615314321

Expropriated

NOR900358

3107-3109 PINE ST

NORA

$10,800

615314320
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type

Identifier

Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

NOR900359
NOR900360
NOR900361
NOR900365
NOR900366
NOR900367
NOR900368
NOR900369
NOR900371
NOR900372
NOR900373
NOR900374
NOR900375
NOR900377
NOR900378
NOR900379
NOR900380
NOR900381
NOR900382
NOR900384
NOR900385
NOR900386
NOR900387
NOR900391
NOR900392
NOR900393
NOR900395
NOR900396
NOR900397
NOR900398
NOR900399
NOR900400
NOR900401
NOR900402
NOR900403
NOR900405
NOR900406
NOR900408
NOR900409
NOR900410
NOR900417

File Address
3111 PINE ST
1221 S SARATOGA ST
3619-3621 FOURTH ST
2421 FLOOD ST
2536-2538 PALMYRA ST
2404-2406 CHARBONNET ST
2618 S SARATOGA ST
2044 HOPE ST
3826-3828 THIRD ST
3212 JACKSON AVE
3219 JACKSON AVE
3600 SECOND ST
2311-2313 S ROMAN ST
1340 HARRISON AVE
3231 JACKSON AVE
50189 FLOOD ST
3331-3333 FIRST ST
2141 ST. MAURICE AVE
5926 N DERBIGNY ST
2022 ALABO ST
2130-2132 ALABO ST
2715-2717 S MIRO ST
3200 JACKSON AVE
1616-1618 ANDRY ST
6228 N GALVEZ ST
1730-1732 FRENCHMEN ST
2307-2309 DESIRE ST
1219-1221 TOURO ST
4220 ERATO ST
3026-3028 FIRST ST
4200 N GALVEZ ST
1549 N GALVEZ ST
3400 JACKSON AVE
2402 REX PL
2321-2323 S ROMAN ST
2337 SEMINOLE PL
2515-2517 S MIRO ST
3328-3330 THIRD ST
3626 FOURTH ST
3234-3236 JACKSON AVE
2712 S ROCHEBLAVE ST

Owner Name
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$10,800
$13,100
$107,800
$12,900
$20,700
$5,400
$5,600
$14,100
$9,200
$15,300
$15,000
$9,000
$13,100
$5,400
$18,000
$6,400
$18,400
$14,600
$5,200
$6,100
$6,100
$14,800
$21,300
$6,200
$7,300
$98,900
$6,800
$8,400
$6,600
$61,400
$4,800
$7,900
$10,000
$9,500
$173,000
$7,500
$8,700
$12,300
$14,700
$13,900
$173,000

Tax Bill Number
615314319
102107106
412404515
39W605713
105201734
39W605515
412203519
37W212607
412405724
412402404
412402305
412404610
412402023
37W419524
412402304
39W613603
412402413
39W510009
39W404306
39W514918
39W514719
412404413
412402427
39W405018
39W503610
37W109812
39W600818
37W104006
102209307
412400513
39W505210
37W202208
412403516
412401217
412402021
412402117
412404609
412402713
412404407
412402409
412405308

Appendix D

APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

Identifier
NOR900418
NOR900419
NOR900420
NOR900421
NOR900422
NOR900426
NOR900429
NOR900430
NOR900431
NOR900432
NOR900434
NOR900435
NOR900436
NOR900442
NOR900444
NOR900445
NOR900446
NOR900453
NOR900454
NOR900455
NOR900456
NOR900457
NOR900459
NOR900460
NOR900462
NOR900465
NOR900470
NOR900472
NOR900475
NOR900479
NOR900481
NOR900484
NOR900486
NOR900488
NOR900494
NOR900495
NOR900497
NOR900499
NOR900500
NOR900505
NOR900506

File Address
2630-2632-2634 S. GALVEZ ST
1323-25 S DERBIGNY ST
3336-3338 FIRST ST
3313-3315 FIRST ST
2420-2422 GRAVIER ST
3332-3334 FIRST ST
2334-2338 CLOUET ST
411 TOLEDANO ST
608 FOURTH ST
3421 MOMUS CT
2413 REX PL
3626 SECOND ST
1956 N PRIEUR ST
3420 THIRD ST
2138 DESLONDE ST
929-931 N VILLERE ST
2114 FRANCE ST
4817 N VILLERE ST
4401 MENDEZ ST
4900 DREUX AVE
2318 BIENVILLE ST
536 S TONTI ST
5067 DEBORE CIR
5900 DEBORE DR
6452 DEBORE DR
5139 PAULINE DR
2613 S SARATOGA ST
2755 ST. ANN ST
2415-17 ST. PHILIP ST
1312-1314 S ROMAN ST
2131-2133 EUTERPE ST
3413 MOMUS CT
3635 THIRD ST
1719 FLOOD ST
5022 N ROBERTSON ST
1500 CATON ST
3226-3228 DELACHAISE ST
1631 N DORGENOIS ST
1826 THIRD ST
3209-3211 DELACHAISE ST
1225 S RAMPART ST

Owner Name
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$11,000
$94,100
$9,600
$13,800
$16,000
$10,200
$2,000
$12,300
$12,600
$8,900
$9,900
$17,100
$140
$1,230
$660
$1,050
$620
$1,090
$1,920
$2,100
$2,500
$2,420
$2,810
$1,620
$1,710
$2,610
$810
$3,500
$5,640
$1,160
$380
$890
$790
$690
$530
$7,480
$5,660
$340
$1,210
$4,910
$560

Tax Bill Number
412403201
102203302
412402508
412402416
104105422
412402522
39W600404
411100207
411104402
412403124
412401213
412404603
37W110316
412403209
39W508713
207105722
39W508217
39W309223
39W025421
39W929803
206202706
105200610
39W930138
39W023825
39W023418
39W930216
412205309
207200237
208107704
102203316
101109419
412403121
412404620
39W410220
39W309015
37W417020
614359711
37W210202
412201020
614360923
102106920
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type

Identifier

Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

NOR900507
NOR900508
NOR900509
NOR900510
NOR900511
NOR900512
NOR900513
NOR900514
NOR900516
NOR900519
NOR900520
NOR900522
NOR900523
NOR900524
NOR900526
NOR900529
NOR900530
NOR900531
NOR900532
NOR900533
NOR900534
NOR900537
NOR900538
NOR900543
NOR900544
NOR900545
NOR900546
NOR900547
NOR900548
NOR900549
NOR900554
NOR900555
NOR900556
NOR900563
NOR900564
NOR900565
NOR900566
NOR900568
NOR900569
NOR900570
NOR900571

File Address
1300 CLARA ST
1304-1306 CLARA ST
1513-1515 ANDRY ST
2012-2014 LASALLE ST
2313 ST. ANDREW ST
2315 WILLOW ST
2730-2732 THALIA ST
2817 THALIA ST
3705/09/11 WASHINGTON AVE
6319 PAULINE DR
6538 PAULINE DR
923-925 LIZARDI ST
5027-5029 DAUPHINE ST
5460 ROYAL ST
2208 ST. ANN ST
5604-5606 DAUPHINE ST
6118-6120 ST. CLAUDE AVE
623 FLOOD ST
920 FLOOD ST
1921-1923 EGANIA ST
2134 BIENVILLE ST
827-829 N ROCHEBLAVE ST
4716 URQUHART ST
2419 IBERVILLE ST
2642-2644 PIETY ST
2201 FELICIANA ST
2339 S DERBIGNY ST
2430-2432 CLOUET ST
2226 FELICIANA ST
1325 ANDRY ST
2414 SPAIN ST
2620 TENNESSEE ST
3936 TOLEDANO ST
2221 IBERVILLE ST
2708-2710 S DERBIGNY ST
2543 ORLEANS AVE
1031 EGANIA ST
3415 CLOUET ST
4317 MENDEZ ST
6307 PAULINE DR
1214-1216 FLOOD ST

Owner Name
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$970
$970
$730
$1,160
$7,100
$3,590
$940
$620
$5,380
$1,010
$1,770
$860
$1,510
$1,900
$7,500
$1,030
$3,100
$1,210
$1,210
$610
$680
$2,260
$940
$800
$340
$400
$1,660
$440
$450
$960
$1,700
$830
$1,040
$2,500
$870
$7,000
$720
$380
$2,070
$1,190
$560

Tax Bill Number
102201709
102201710
39W402819
412300416
412300318
412306818
101110915
102201822
412405301
39W023617
39W023229
39W202505
39W111807
39W104805
207108116
39W109702
39W203924
39W104707
39W202720
39W502406
206201913
207109128
39W301813
206203006
39W615317
39W513301
412401117
39W607625
39W513410
39W306720
38W203116
39W616727
614361407
206202215
412400209
207109211
39W204917
39W719114
39W025434
39W023619
39W301005
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

Identifier
NOR900572
NOR900573
NOR900574
NOR900577
NOR900580
NOR900581
NOR900582
NOR900584
NOR900585
NOR900587
NOR900588
NOR900589
NOR900591
NOR900593
NOR900594
NOR900595
NOR900596
NOR900600
NOR900601
NOR900602
NOR900603
NOR900604
NOR900605
NOR900606
NOR900607
NOR900608
NOR900609
NOR900610
NOR900612
NOR900613
NOR900616
NOR900617
NOR900618
NOR900619
NOR900621
NOR900622
NOR900623
NOR900624
NOR900626
NOR900627
NOR900629

File Address
1930 ANDRY ST
2136 PAINTERS ST
2508 PAINTERS ST
5722 PEOPLES
4711 ARTHUR DR
1704 EGANIA ST
1908 REYNES ST
3038 FELICIANA ST
3417 CLOUET ST
5014 N DERBIGNY ST
5029 ST. CLAUDE AVE
636 LIZARDI ST
911 LIZARDI ST
3048 LOUISA ST
3201 LOUISA ST
3226 LOUISA ST
3232 LOUISA ST
1214 CHARBONNET ST
1225 FLOOD ST
1259 TENNESSEE ST
1318 FLOOD ST
1407 JOURDAN AVE
1432 JOURDAN AVE
1739-1741 EGANIA ST
1802-1804 EGANIA ST
2031 LAHARPE ST
5410 URQUHART ST
5433 MARAIS ST
1440 AVIATORS ST
5401 CONGRESS DR
1405 JOURDAN AVE
1410 EGANIA ST
46512 CHARBONNET ST
1503 LESSEPS ST
2104 S JOHNSON ST
2517 WASHINGTON AVE
2701 S PRIEUR ST
2703 MISTLETOE ST
3333-3335 FELICIANA ST
4032 VELIE ST
47750 ANDRY ST

Owner Name
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$610
$560
$2,300
$1,350
$1,080
$550
$830
$350
$380
$560
$710
$710
$860
$330
$300
$330
$330
$360
$960
$860
$640
$700
$530
$1,030
$540
$4,880
$610
$1,070
$2,440
$3,050
$700
$900
$600
$3,320
$1,500
$1,260
$810
$680
$360
$200
$1,240

Tax Bill Number
39W502416
38W111411
38W203814
38W410519
39W934915
39W409822
39W513719
39W709606
39W719116
39W405321
39W209801
39W105111
39W202502
39W709326
39W713801
39W713912
39W713911
39W300714
39W300911
39W212827
39W306709
39W309204
39W311401
39W409910
39W412222
37W201501
39W301208
39W301001
37W532212
39W024801
39W309203
39W308803
39W308208
39W401901
412402308
412303201
412402817
716325805
39W714615
39W800801
39W412121
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type

Identifier

Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

NOR900630
NOR900633
NOR900635
NOR900636
NOR900637
NOR900643
NOR900649
NOR900653
NOR900654
NOR900658
NOR900660
NOR900661
NOR900662
NOR900663
NOR900664
NOR900665
NOR900666
NOR900667
NOR900668
NOR900669
NOR900670
NOR900671
NOR900672
NOR900673
NOR900674
NOR900675
NOR900676
NOR900677
NOR900678
NOR900679
NOR900680
NOR900681
NOR900682
NOR900683
NOR900684
NOR900685
NOR900686
NOR900687
NOR900688
NOR900689
NOR900690

File Address
4795801 JOURDAN AVE
5006 N ROMAN ST
5425 N VILLERE ST
5434 N ROMAN ST
8828 BELFAST ST
1427 URSULINES
2700 PAINTERS ST
2322 EADS ST
2709 ARTS ST
5515 SEMINARY PL
6894 PARC BRITTANY
2114 BENTON
2133-35 BENTON
2217 GORDON
2245-47 BENTON
2300 BENTON
2305 BENTON
2314 BENTON
2320-22 BENTON
2323-25 BENTON
2333 BENTON
2428 BENTON
2241-43 BENTON
2441 BENTON
2326-28 BENTON
2125-27 BENTON
1935 CAFFIN
1941 CAFFIN
2043 CAFFIN
2125 CAFFIN
1703 CHARBONNET
1713 CHARBONNET
1827 CHARBONNET
1906 CHARBONNET
1919 CHARBONNET
2216 CHARBONNET
2413 CHARBONNET
2419 CHARBONNET
2427 CHARBONNET
2527 CHARBONNET
2542 CHARBONNET

Owner Name
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$670
$660
$840
$580
$4,140
$1,660
$540
$1,080
$670
$4,380
$940
$530
$990
$460
$380
$380
$340
$340
$670
$340
$340
$340
$340
$340
$340
$1,500
$620
$620
$480
$620
$610
$610
$610
$710
$1,210
$820
$610
$610
$610
$610
$540

Tax Bill Number
39W415002
39W409613
39W308630
39W410008
716323314
208104006
38W205701
38W202109
38W205717
39W026827
39W069908
39W509621
39W509703
39W510714
39W510908
39W602919
39W603002
39W602909
39W602908
39W603005
39W603009
39W605109
39W510919
39W605005
39W602916
39W509709
39W502809
39W502810
39W504126
39W509507
39W410501
39W410504
39W415106
39W514220
39W515004
39W514116  
39W617004  
39W617005  
39W617007  
39W617107  
39W610712  
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated
Expropriated

Identifier
NOR900691
NOR900692
NOR900693
NOR900694
NOR900695
NOR900696
NOR900698
NOR900699
NOR900700
NOR900701
NOR900702
NOR900703
NOR900704
NOR900705
NOR900706
NOR900707
NOR900708
NOR900709
NOR900712
NOR900718
NOR900719
NOR900722
NOR900725
NOR900731
NOR900736
NOR900857
NOR900859
NOR900860
NOR900861
NOR900865
NOR900868
NOR900869
NOR900870
NOR900871
NOR900872
NOR900873
NOR900874
NOR900875
NOR900876
NOR900877
NOR900878

File Address
2423 DELERY
2227 GORDON
2306 GORDON
2334 GORDON
2440-42 GORDON
2535 GORDON
1312-14 GORDON
2033 GORDON
2422 GORDON
2510 CHARBONNET
2511 CHARBONNET
2329 DELERY
1630 GORDON
6421 MARQUE
2242 TRICOU
2433 TRICOU
5842 WHIPPLE
1329-31 GOV. NICHOLLS
40735 MAYO ROAD
2132 BENTON ST
1214801 MURL ST
1514 ODEON
919-29 N ROCHEBLAVE
2001 THALIA ST
2325 BENTON ST
2436-2438 GRAVIER ST
648 S GAYOSO ST
314-316 N PRIEUR ST
419-421 N PRIEUR ST
5016 MITHRA ST
1031 BELLEVILLE ST
1220 BELLEVILLE ST
1228 BELLEVILLE ST
518 DIANA ST
1301 ELMIRA AVE
1052101 ELMIRA AVE
422 HOMER ST
509 HOMER ST
839 BELLEVILLE ST
819 HOMER ST
1102701 LEBOEUF ST

Owner Name
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORA
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU
NORU

Fighting Blight Through Innovative Financing: An Examination of Social Impact Bonds

2014 Total
Value
$550
$460
$340
$340
$340
$460
$600
$600
$340
$540
$610
$640
$520
$420
$680
$890
$850
$27,070
$22,820
$530
$8,750
$8,500
$480
$14,710
$540
$7,390
$1,720
$3,000
$1,670
$1,430
$1,150
$1,440
$1,130
$1,230
$1,080
$1,980
$2,030
$2,050
$1,920
$1,940
$1,100

Tax Bill Number
39W604314  
39W510716  
39W603120  
39W603114  
39W604904  
39W611409  
39W307203  
39W503803  
39W604919  
39W610720  
39W617104  
39W603605  
39W404307  
39W212512  
39W510523  
39W604412  
39W610809  
208103608  
39W016010  
39W509617  
513514314  
513702906  
207109029  
102106814  
39W603006  
104105418  
105203605  
206201007  
206201621  
39W024507  
513207606  
513302605  
513302607  
513207811  
513304022  
513205716  
513204515  
513205303  
513204210  
513205621  
513304509
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APPENDIX D: EXPROPRIATED AND ADJUDICATED PROPERTIES
Type

Identifier

File Address

Owner Name

2014 Total
Value

Expropriated NOR900879
1205 LEBOEUF ST
NORU
$800
Expropriated NOR900880
1519 LEBOEUF ST
NORU
$1,340
Expropriated NOR900881
1306 PTOLEMY ST
NORU
$660
Expropriated NOR900882
1308 PTOLEMY ST
NORU
$660
Expropriated NOR900883
1014 TECHE ST
NORU
$2,290
Expropriated NOR900884
1100 VALLETTE ST
NORU
$1,150
Expropriated NOR900885
1202 LEBOEUF ST
NORU
$680
Expropriated NOR900886
615 NEWTON ST
NORU
$340
Expropriated NOR900887
416 NEWTON ST
NORU
$1,980
Expropriated NOR900888
1231 NUNEZ ST
NORU
$920
Expropriated NOR900889
827 VERRET ST
NORU
$770
Expropriated NOR900890
831 VERRET ST
NORU
$870
Expropriated NOR900891
341 SLIDELL ST
NORU
$1,320
Expropriated NOR900892
1102301 THAYER ST
NORU
$1,070
Expropriated NOR900893
834 ELMIRA AVE
NORU
$1,260
Expropriated NOR900894
900 ELMIRA AVE
NORU
$2,020
Expropriated NOR900895
909 HOMER ST
NORU
$1,950
Expropriated NOR900896
9050001 ELMIRA ST
NORU
$1,460
Expropriated NOR900897
1229-1231 BELLEVILLE ST
NORU
$560
Expropriated NOR900898
1230 BELLEVILLE ST
NORU
$570
Expropriated NOR900899
1066501 VERRET ST
NORU
$770
Expropriated NOR900900
1338 NUNEZ ST
NORU
$1,410
Expropriated NOR900901
3217 LAMARQUE ST
NORU
$780
Expropriated NOR900902
3201 LAMARQUE ST
NORU
$400
Expropriated NOR900903
3205 PTOLEMY ST
NORU
$770
Expropriated NOR900963
1914-1916 FORSTALL ST
NORU
$390
Expropriated NOR900342
2102-10 ERATO ST
NORA
No Data
Expropriated NOR900370
3914 ERATO ST
NORA
No Data
Expropriated
3423-3425 FOURTH ST
NORA
No Data
Expropriated NOR900424
3237-3239 FIRST ST
NORA
No Data
Expropriated NOR900487
3829-3831 FOURTH ST
NORU
No Data
Expropriated NOR900561
2600 GALLIER ST
NORA
No Data
Expropriated NOR900590
724 LIZARDI ST
NORU
No Data
Expropriated NOR900632
4820 N. JOHNSON ST
NORU
No Data
Expropriated NOR900710
13001 I-10 SERVICE ROAD
NORA
No Data
Source: Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, UNO-PLUS Community Development Finance Capstone Study Team Analysis
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Tax Bill Number
513302302  
513307912  
513305410  
513305411  
513207902  
513300701  
513302201  
513207717  
513205221  
513303009  
513204411  
513204410  
513204609  
513304412  
513204016  
513205715  
513205720  
513205627  
513302703  
513302608  
513207707  
513303808  
513702413  
513702408  
513702930  
39W502104  
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data

Appendix D

APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Adjudicated properties: Properties being held due to delinquent taxes.
Expropriated properties: Properties acquired by the City of New Orleans
because of blight and transferred to NORA.
Higher flood risk: Properties that have a flood risk higher than 66%.
Louisiana Land Trust (LLT) Properties: Properties transferred to NORA
from the Louisiana Land Trust. These properties were acquired through the
Road Home program after Hurricane Katrina. Property owners were offered
the option to sell their homes to the state.
Lower flood risk: Properties that have a 33% or less chance of flooding.
Moderate flood risk: Properties that have a chance of flooding greater than
33% and less than 66%.
Strong markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of A, B, or C.
Transitional markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of D or E.
Weak markets: Census blocks with an MVA classification of F, G, or H.
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